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Critical race scholars have highlighted the US government’s role in aiding violence 
against minorities. Since 1990, the same US government has been collecting hate crime data. 
What does this data—and its gaps—show us about continuing injustices and violence against 
minorities in the US? Hate crime legislation, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s hate 
crime data, are examined via critical race, geography, and critical data visualization theory. 
Visualization and statistical analysis explore spatiotemporal patterns. The thesis finds little 
correlation between legislation and data, but questions whether laws fail to effect 
documentation—or if their influence is lessened by factors like lack of enforcement. A 
correlation is found between local agency reporting and reported rates of hate crime. 
Geovisualizations illuminate spatial clustering, suggesting influence by local and regional 
sociopolitical factors. This thesis shows the importance of agency reporting to data quality—and 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
On February 10, 2015, three Muslim youth in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, were 
murdered by their neighbor. Despite the murderer having shown signs of anti-Muslim bias 
against Deah, 23, his wife Yusor, 21, and her sister Razan, 19, the incident was initially cast by 
police and media as a parking dispute. The police did not record the incident as a hate crime—it 
is not present in official US statistics. A stark example of anti-Muslim violence is thus erased, 
invisible in the abstract numbers collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 
The FBI’s statistics are the most comprehensive available for the United States, yet there 
are clear gaps in the data (US Commission on Civil Rights 2019). The FBI began collecting its 
statistics from local law enforcement agencies in 1991, under the Hate Crime Statistics Act. 
There is no federal mandate for local agencies to report hate crimes to the FBI. 23 states require 
agencies to report—yet even in these states, there is not a 100% reporting rate. Aside from lack 
of reporting, the data is influenced by other factors including police-community relationships, 
incentive and ability of victims to report to local agencies, police training, and local political 
context. Prosecution of hate crimes is a separate process, and does not guarantee their presence 
in the data. The data does not include federally prosecuted hate crime cases—local agency 
reporting is the only opportunity for a case to be recorded. 
When mapped (Figure 1), the data show disproportionate geographic variation. New 
Jersey shows the highest rates of reported hate crime, while large swaths of Mississippi, 
Alabama, and Georgia show none. 
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Figure 1: Average Reported Hate Crime Rate in US, 1991-2017 
 
Why would the data look like this? What particular factors influenced the lack of hate 
crime reporting counts in the South, and spurred more rigorous data collection in places like New 
Jersey? 
Legislation is one contributing factor cited by literature (Bell 2002, McDevitt & Iwama 
2016). Academic literature and policy briefs on official statistics emphasize hate crime laws 
among a multitude of factors influencing the accuracy of hate crime reporting in the US (Arab 
American Institute Foundation 2018, Iwama 2018). While violence against minorities has always 
existed in the US, the concept of hate crimes was defined into existence by hate crime 
legislation. The first federal hate crime law was passed in 1990. While the law defined hate 
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crimes and created a reporting system for local agencies, it was not until 1994 that the federal 
government was required to investigate and prosecute potential hate crimes. 
State hate crime laws were passed starting in the 1970s, and may cover different crimes, 
and different bias motivations, than federal law. Four states still lack hate crime laws. In addition 
to laws defining hate crimes, 23 states have passed data reporting mandates, and 15 have passed 
police training mandates. In summary, there are significant variations in hate crime legislation 
across states—in how (or if) hate crimes are defined, if data collection is mandated, and if police 
training to recognize bias-motivated crimes is required. The FBI’s data has consequently been 
created by hate crime legislation, which first defined it into existence, and then played a hand in 
its collection. 
A report released by the US Commission for Civil Rights in 2019 highlights the 
importance of quantitative data, urging the federal government to develop incentives for police to 
report hate crimes. In its findings, the Commission urges, “Preventing hate crimes is 
substantially more challenging without national data and police training to accurately identify 
and report them” (p. 219). Quantitative data allows for conclusions about the current level of 
hate crimes in the US—it is trusted as a “big picture” look informing policy change, as opposed 
to anecdotal evidence (Dodson et al. 2015). Catherine E. Lhamon, chair of the US Commission 
on Civil Rights, asserted in testimony to Congress that “the absence of effective data hamstrings 
any effective response that we as a nation might have” (Glickhouse 2019). 
Hate crime legislation, including police training mandates, has for decades been sought 
by advocacy groups (Schwencke 2017). However, this project’s statistical analysis—from 
bivariate visualization to multiple regression—finds little correlation between legislation and 
reported hate crime rates. In contrast, a significant positive correlation is found between agency 
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participation in the FBI’s voluntary reporting program, and reported hate crime rates. It would 
seem that when local law enforcement agencies are recording and submitting data, they have a 
higher likelihood of reporting hate crimes—but that legislation alone does not increase their 
likelihood of reporting hate crimes. Further discussion of this finding is provided in the thesis’ 
conclusion. It is hypothesized that the complex factors affecting hate crime reporting render hate 
crime laws ineffectual on the data without on-the-ground enforcement. The spatial clustering 
observed in geovisualizations of the data reinforces this hypothesis, indicating there may be local 
and region-specific sociopolitical factors contributing to underreporting. 
This project therefore focuses in depth on the possibility of gaps in the data, as shown by 
statistical analysis and geovisualization. Visualizations of the data communicate geographic and 
temporal variation in agency participation rates, reported rates across bias motivations, and 
legislation. This project is foregrounded by the understanding that hate crime legislation and data 
collection systems were produced within a complex legal framework that has, through its 
evolution, permitted slavery and Jim Crow, genocide, colonization, and exclusionary 
immigration policies. Rather than trying to understand the occurrence of hate crimes through this 
system, this project interrogates the system itself. It is concerned with the reported occurrence of 
hate crimes—with what can be illustrated about the FBI’s data by analyzing reporting rates and 
legislation. Its questions and visualizations focus on the potential of missing cases like Deah, 
Yusor, and Razan’s, as well as the laws that might be correlated. This project asks what the 
FBI’s hate crime statistics illuminate—and fail to illuminate—about the realities of bias-




I join previous literature in asserting that FBI-maintained hate crime statistics are 
indicative of political and legal mechanisms, as much as they reflect incidents of violence. 
Collecting and presenting quantitative hate crime data is not a straightforward process, but one 
that requires analyzing the political and legal mechanisms that could be influencing the data. My 
project is thus concerned with three questions: 1) Are there patterns or relationships that can be 
shown by mapping the FBI’s hate crime data? 2) If patterns in the data exist, are they connected 
to hate crime legislation? and 3) How can these relationships be visualized to communicate the 
complexities of legislation, and the reporting system? 
Question 1 asks what is in the data; Question 2 asks why. Due to the scope of this thesis, 
Question 2 specifically focuses on hate crime legislation. With Question 2, I examine how 
legislation across states could affect or relate to hate crime reporting. 
 These questions build on earlier surveys of hate crime reporting and legislation—as well 
as community-focused research—in a period when the FBI’s hate crime statistics are frequently 
utilized to understand the realities of bias-motivated violence in the US. 
Theoretical Background 
 This project draws on a diverse array of literature: scholarship on hate crimes; geography 
scholarship on race, place and law; and feminist and critical GIS/data visualization. My analysis 
is also informed by concepts from feminist geopolitics and feminist political geography. 
 Question 2 is addressed with scholarship on hate crimes, as well as on race, place, and 
law. These two literatures also inform the approach to Questions 1 and 3. Methods and concepts 
drawn from feminist and critical GIS/data visualization are used to address Questions 1 and 3. 
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 Hate crime scholarship is situated mainly in criminology and sociology, and spans a wide 
range of theoretical and methodological approaches. I draw specifically upon studies using 
quantitative methodologies (Disha et al. 2011, Stacey 2015) to build my statistical analysis, but 
also consider the concepts present in theoretical, qualitative, and policy approaches (Arab 
American Institute Foundation 2018, Bell 2002, Iwama 2018). The more critical theoretical 
approaches are often in conversation with critical race theory, questioning states’ use of the hate 
crime as a framework to define and address bias-motivated violence (Bell 2002). I therefore look 
to critical race theory, and geography scholarship on race and law, to put the framework of hate 
crime into conversation with the historical context of violence against minorities in the US. One 
example is the racialized legal exclusion of Muslims from US citizenship (Beydoun 2018), that 
was ended with the Civil Rights Act of 1968—the same legislation that first provided the legal 
basis for prosecuting bias-motivated crimes. 
In addition, feminist geopolitics, and feminist political geography, provide vital 
consideration of the multi-scale relations of power embedded in legal frameworks (Dowler and 
Sharp 2001), connecting geopolitics to everyday practices. This emphasis on multi-scale spatial 
analysis helps contextualize the way statistics abstract and represent individual instances of hate 
crime, and how different legal frameworks, reporting systems and jurisdictions are 
interconnected with political context. Domestic geopolitics (Vasudevan and Smith 2019) 
provides a conceptual bridge between feminist geopolitics and critical race theory—
contextualizing US-based racism as geopolitical. 
 Feminist and critical GIS/data visualization literature, as well as literature on data and 
activism, is instrumental for creating and contextualizing maps of hate crime statistics and 
legislation. It provides considerations for visualizing data, many of which are in conversation 
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with research reproducibility: for example, acknowledging the labor, methodologies, and 
categories used that could introduce particular points of view into quantitative data that is 
ostensibly neutral and empiric. Visualization of the mechanics of the data collection system, as 
well as the details of legislation, alongside hate crime data provides analytical tools for 
understanding the realities that the data reflect—and fail to reflect. 
Situating the Project 
My interest behind this project’s diverse methodologies stems from coursework in 
feminist geography, critical theory and Latin America/Middle East Studies, and participatory 
methodologies. With their emphasis on the situated nature of knowledge production, feminist 
geography and participatory methodologies forced me to examine the material benefits of 
academic scholarship. Their calls to feminist action led me to learn about the Open Access 
movement through Google searches, when mention of it was absent in the work we read. And 
they instilled in me a conviction that if my academic scholarship is not accessible—both in 
language and in free, open digital availability—it misses vital opportunities for rigorous review 
by both experts in the academy, and experts in the experiences it seeks to investigate. 
Academics and activists (Pulido 2002, Haji Molana 2019, Mahtani 2014, Manzoor-Khan 
2018) note the paucity of scholars from marginalized backgrounds and communities in 
academia. Through what better method, then, can academics fact-check their work on the 
experiences of marginalized communities than to make it freely accessible to individuals from 
such communities? Than to make ourselves vulnerable to their critique and constructive 
feedback? Communities have real research needs (Tuck 2019); if academics are not responding 
to and engaging with them, how can communities even learn about the resources available to 
meet their needs? As Minelle Mahtani relates, lived racialized injustices such as premature death 
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“cannot be distilled down to primarily a social construct. Comfortable perches in academia allow 
us to be distanced from these spaces and it is that distance that needs to be bridged” (2014, p. 
361). 
Coursework in critical theory specific to Middle East and Latin American Studies also 
forced me to question the situated nature of knowledge production, but from a different angle. It 
increased my literacy in the theories produced by scholars located at the fringe or outside of US 
and Anglophone academia. It thus led me to realize the situated nature of frameworks used by 
much of critical and feminist geography literature—that they are located in genealogies of 
thought lacking the concepts used by non-English speakers to describe their daily experiences. 
Critical theory and area studies also illuminated how US academics’ work abroad can 
reproduce the US’ imperial relationship with Muslim majority and Latin American countries. 
This, combined with feminist epistemologies and participatory methodologies, pushed me to 
examine the geographic scope in which I could best leverage the resources of academic 
knowledge production in an ethical manner. 
I thus began examining how research needs of communities are addressed. One approach 
is through collaborative, or participatory, methodologies (Tuhiwai Smith 2012, Nagar 2014). 
Geography research includes participatory mapping, as well as research design sensitive to 
historical and structural oppressions. Geographer Cindy Katz notes the importance of the latter, 
citing María Milagros López’s admonition “not to render the practices of the oppressed visible to 
those who dominate, but to make the operations of capitalism and patriarchy more transparent to 
the oppressed groups” (Katz 1994, p. 71) (cited in Gupta 2019). 
However, after the 2015 murders of Our Three Winners, and among an uptick in reported 
hate crimes, another approach showed promise for addressing community needs—the analysis of 
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quantitative data. Quantitative data has been shown to greatly influence lawmakers’ decisions 
about health (Dodson et al. 2015). This was a far cry from the academic experience I had with 
qualitative research methods, but it seemed like the family and friends of the three young 
Muslims killed in Chapel Hill did not need a researcher to feed them a narrative of the 
Islamophobia they had already experienced. They can tell their own story, and have been—on 
platforms ranging from media interviews (CNN 2015, Barakat 2018), to Ted Talks (Barakat 
2016) and documentary, to testimony before US Congress (Abu-Salha 2019). 
Indeed, the name by which Deah, Yusor, and Razan are now widely known — “Our 
Three Winners” — could be seen as an activist reclaiming of their narrative. The term was 
publicized when Deah’s brother, Farris Barakat, started the “Our Three Winners” Facebook page 
the night of their murder (Our Three Winners 2019). He wrote, “I know my brother, his wife, 
and his sister-in-law are together as ultimate winners. This life was only ever a test and they have 
passed with flying colors. They have won, and for that I rejoice” (quoted in Gambino & Woolf 
2015). In coining “Our Three Winners,” Barakat referenced the youths’ Muslim faith, and the 
belief that “we aren't living for this world” (Yusor Abu-Salha quoted in Our Three Winners 
2019a). 
While advocating against the Islamophobia and hate that lead to their deaths, Barakat and 
his community have used their platforms to highlight the activism and excellent character 
displayed by Our Three Winners during their lives (Our Three Winners 2019b). The Chapel Hill 
Police initially reported the murders as the result of a parking dispute, but the families pushed 
back on this narrative in national media — and founded the Our Three Winners Foundation, 
which is dedicated to advocacy against hate (Barakat 2015a, Barakat 2015b, Barakat 2016, 
Barakat 2018). In his April 2019 testimony before U.S. Congress, Yusor and Razan’s father 
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Mohammad Abu-Salha asserted, “Three beautiful young Americans were brutally murdered and 
there is no question in our minds that this tragedy was born of bigotry and hate. And people all 
over the world joined us in calling it what it was: a hate crime.” From their experiences, Our 
Three Winners’ family and friends are producing theory and knowledge (Wright 2018), which 
this project augments with quantitative data. 
In her discussion of geographers’ limited engagement with race, Mahtani addresses 
cultural geographers’ skepticism toward working with quantitative data—data that could be used 
for practical outcomes: 
“Ceri Peach denounces what he sees as the flaws of a new cultural geography, insisting that it ‘teaches us 
that everything is nuanced, plastic and fluid, so that the analysis of census-given ethnic or racialized 
categories may be represented as static and empiricist’ (Peach 2002: 252). This ‘myopic focus upon 
subjectivity and identity’ (Nayak 2011: 558) has opened up a space for geographers to engage with race as 
it is related to issues of difference and diversity, and the politics of representation (Jackson 1996) rather 
than necessarily offer focused accounts that engage and challenge social inequality head-on (Nayak 2011)” 
(Mahtani 2014, p. 363). 
 
The review Mahtani cites, from social geographer Ceri Peach, discusses the practical 
potential of working with census categories: 
“In order to measure the extent of these [racialized] inequalities, we collect data by racialized categories. 
Thereby we may be represented as reifying the categories that we seek to de-essentialize. Anti-racist 
legislation itself necessarily employs the categories which it is seeking to resist. Abolishing the categories, 
however, does not abolish the issues; the issues simply become more difficult to quantify” (Peach 2002, p. 
253). 
 
Peach is addressing tendencies he attributes to the subfield of cultural geography, in 
which scholars at the time challenged categories used for data collection and statistical analysis. I 
approach statistics as constructed, but also from a similar perspective to Peach’s—recognizing 
that statistics are used as practical tools for advocacy outside of the academy, and relevant to 
research that addresses the needs of marginalized communities. This study thus critically 
engages quantitative questions that are relevant to anti-racist advocacy and legislation. 
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In addition, this study considers how trends in the data may be communicated to various 
audiences. These audiences include the general public, advocacy workers and policymakers, and 
scholars from multiple disciplines. Throughout the production of the text and figures presented in 
this thesis, I have reflected on which sections will speak most to which audiences. I accept that 
different audiences will likely be most interested in different types of analysis. For example, 
while academics may scrutinize the full results of the statistical regression, policymakers and 
journalists may emphasize only the final conclusion; that statistically, reported hate crime rates 
are not correlated with legislation. Likewise, scholars may appreciate the complexity of the 
bivariate chart showing state hate crime rates relative to year when legislation was passed—but 
the general public and community groups may most value the charts with a more straightforward 
message. 
Furthermore, multiple audiences may need different communication products. Scholars 
may find this thesis in the Carolina Digital Repository, and policymakers may be able to use a 
full-length report akin to this thesis. However, community and advocacy groups with limited 
resources may need a more concise tool to understand the data. Therefore, in addition to 
examining how trends the data might be best visualized for communication, this thesis considers 
the possibilities brought by using a tool such as ArcGIS StoryMaps. I also strive to make the 
language used as clear as possible, especially in the Introduction and Background sections. 
Methodology 
A review of academic literature on hate crimes revealed two aspects of hate crime 
statistics critical to this study’s methodology: the constructed nature of official hate crime 
statistics, and a paucity of geovisualization of these statistics in academic scholarship. 
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Maintained by the FBI, official statistics are a product of legislation. Laws define what 
hate crimes are—and these laws are rooted in a sociohistoric context particular to the US. They 
define protected groups, crimes eligible to be considered hate crimes, and requirements for 
police training, data collection, and data reporting. One study investigated the statistical 
relationship of legislation to official hate crime reporting counts (Stacey 2015). This fit my 
interest in examining quantitative data, in a way that could be put into dialogue with a critical 
approach to hate crime statistics. I thus adapted Stacey’s methodology for the first section of this 
study, and have expanded the focus to analyze a wider range of years and protected groups. The 
Data and Statistical Analysis subsections address my methodology in greater detail. 
Regarding geovisualization—the clearest, most current maps I could find were produced 
by advocacy organizations, including the Arab American Institute Foundation (2018) and the 
Anti-Defamation League. Why do numerous sociology and criminology studies of hate crime 
lack maps? These studies consistently emphasize the geographically rooted nature of hate 
crimes—that they are defined and prosecuted in regionally specific political contexts (Bell 1996, 
Bell 2002, Disha et al. 2011, Grattet et al. 1998, Iwama 2018a, McDevitt & Iwama 2016, 
McVeigh et al. 2003, Perry 2005). Geographers directly address the spatial nature of hate crimes 
from a theoretical perspective (Flint 2004). 
Visualizing qualitative and quantitative data augments theoretical and statistical 
engagements. It enhances comprehension of the legal and sociopolitical connections across 
spatial scale that comprise hate crimes. Looking at a map of counties with agencies that report 
hate crimes, for instance, reveals huge gaps in Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia—states with 
some of the highest recorded rates of lynching in the early 1900s. Statistical analysis is useful for 
academic and advocacy purposes, but without effective communication of the trends these 
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statistics hold, lacks depth and opportunity for critical engagement. I thus decided to experiment 
with static and interactive maps, or geovisualizations, for the second section of my study. The 
Geovisualization chapter details how I made these maps. 
To collate these maps into a narrative, I created an ArcGIS StoryMap called “Mapping 
Hate Crime Data.” Inspired by digital humanities projects and a recent UNC digital dissertation, 
this website contains links to the FBI’s raw master files, the R code used to clean and analyze the 
data, the codebook of legislation by state, and static and interactive geovisualizations of hate 

















CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND: WHAT IS A HATE CRIME? 
"hate crimes are made rather than solved" – Jeannine Bell 2002, p. 8 
The Concept in Federal Legislation 
The term “hate crime” has been tossed around by the media frequently in recent years. Yet the 
term didn’t come into common use until the late 1980s, as states passed hate crime legislation. 
The federal US government passed its first hate crime legislation in 1990. The Hate Crime 
Statistics Act encompassed two main points. It defined hate crimes as: 
“crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, 
including where appropriate the crimes of murder, non-negligent manslaughter; forcible rape; aggravated 
assault, simple assault, intimidation; arson; and destruction, damage or vandalism of property.” 
(Congress.gov 2019) 
The Act also required the Department of Justice to begin collecting statistics on hate 
crimes committed because of the victim's race, religion, or ethnicity. A 2009 law, Matthew 
Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, added the categories of gender, sexual 
orientation, gender identity, and disability. 
States, however, are under no obligation to pass the exact same laws. Some states—like 
California, Arizona and New York—passed hate crime legislation well before 1990, while others 
only passed laws in the years following. Four states still lack what is commonly referred to as 
“hate crime legislation.” Arkansas, Georgia, South Carolina, and Wyoming might provide legal 
protection from discrimination and cross burning, but their courts cannot prosecute any violent 
act as a hate crime. From the perspective of hate crime data, means that police departments have 
no basis upon which to define any case as a hate crime, or to report such case to the FBI.  
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The concept of a hate crime is closely tied to legal definitions. Legislation defined hate 
crimes into existence in the US. Despite a history of violent acts targeting vulnerable populations 
in the US, the genocide of Indigenous people, everyday violence against enslaved Africans and 
Indigenous people, and pre-1991 lynching of minorities were not prosecuted as hate crimes. The 
Enforcement Act of 1871 was the first federal legislation aimed at combating racially motivated 
violence, as then-president Ulysses S. Grant sought to use federal troops to address the Ku Klux 
Klan and other white supremacist organizations. Its provisions are codified in the current 42 US 
Code § 1983, “Civil action for deprivation of rights”, and echoed in state civil action laws (Civil 
act for deprivation of rights 1983). 
While acts of violence in the US date back centuries, the concept of hate crimes is newer, 
enabled by the Civil Rights Act of 1968. If the Enforcement Act of 1871 provided the basis for 
current civil action legislation, the Civil Rights Act of 1968 is the genealogic foundation of 
current hate crime legislation. The Act was the first federal law to allow state prosecution of 
anyone who “willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate or 
interfere with ... any person because of his race, color, religion or national origin” (US Code 
§ 245 2019).  
Beginning in 1990, federal hate crime legislation built upon this legal foundation. States 
had started passing hate crime laws in late 1970, during blowback against 1960s civil rights 
gains. Advocacy and civil rights organizations pushed for policymakers’ attention towards rising 
bias-motivated violence, resulting in increasing hate crime legislation at the state and, finally, 
national level. The case of Michael Griffiths, murdered by four white men in 1986, added greater 
pressure to policymakers (Schwencke 2017). The Hate Crime Statistics Act was passed by 
Congress and signed in 1990 by then-president George H.W. Bush, who referenced federal 
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prosecution of hate crimes, but failed to mention the act did not allow for such (The American 
Presidency Project 2019). 
The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 only defined hate crimes, and mandated 
collection— it was the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 that required 
federal prosecution of hate crimes. Buried in a several hundred-page document, SEC. 280003 of 
the Act stipulates that the US Sentencing Commission: 
“shall promulgate guidelines or amend existing guidelines to provide sentencing enhancements of not less 
than 3 offense levels for offenses that the finder of fact at trial determines beyond a reasonable doubt are 
hate crimes” (House.gov 2018). 
This model of legislation is echoed in state laws across the country, and constitutes what 
is commonly referred to as hate crime legislation. The power to set and enhance penalties, or 
“penalty enhancement,” is what gives courts as basis to prosecute cases as hate crimes. On the 
federal level, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 provides for penalty 
enhancement to cases that are already considered crimes: “murder, non-negligent manslaughter; 
forcible rape; aggravated assault, simple assault, intimidation; arson; and destruction, damage or 
vandalism of property” (Congress.gov 1990). 
The Act of 1994 allows the federal government to prosecute cases like Our Three 
Winners’. However, this case does not exist in the FBI’s data on hate crimes, which only records 
cases reported by local law enforcement. Local law enforcement practices regarding hate crime 
data greatly depend on state legislation. 
State Legislation 
The concept of hate crime is only as strong as the laws that allow for its prosecution. And 
these laws vary wildly across states and localities. Among states, legislation differs in who it 
protects, what crimes it covers, and what data collection and police training it mandates. This 
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produces different definitions of hate crime, resulting in differences in reporting rates. As legal 
scholar Jeannine Bell asserts, “hate crimes are made rather than solved” (2002, p. 8). 
On the production of hate crimes, Bell writes, "They are constructed, pieced together, and 
pass through several stages before hate crime charges can be brought against a suspect" (2002, p. 
8). The systems that produce hate crime charges are fraught with differing regulations on police 
training, data collection, and the definition of hate crime itself, that result in charges reflective of 
local and state politics. The following sections provide an overview of these legislative 
differences across states. 
Is It a Crime? Penalty Enhancement 
Penalty enhancement laws take on two different meanings—one in activist records and 
journalism, and one in academic research on hate crimes. Penalty enhancement legislation, by 
definition, enhances penalties for crimes already existing in a government’s criminal code. For 
example, if a person were convicted of murder and sentenced to ten years in prison, that number 
of years could be increased if prosecutors could prove the murder was motivated by bias. 
Both the Arab-American Institute and the Anti-Defamation League consider penalty 
enhancement laws under this broader definition. No matter how the legislation was formed—by 
adding on clauses to an existing statute, as a separate statute, or in another way—they consider 
penalty enhancement laws to be those that allow for the criminal prosecution and sentencing of 
hate crime perpetrators. It is these laws they consider “hate crime legislation.” 
By contrast, academic research on hate crimes has developed a more nuanced definition 
of penalty enhancement laws. In Making Hate a Crime, Valerie Jenness and Ryken Grattet 
develop a five-category spectrum of hate crime legislation (2001). Approaching hate crime from 
backgrounds in sociology and criminology, Jenness and Grattet design their spectrum to account 
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for how embedded hate crime laws are in existing legislation. By “embedded,” Jenness and 
Grattet refer to how much the existing legal code changed—or if an entirely new statute 
created—to address hate crimes. If more embedded, legal code was slightly changed to include a 
penalty enhancement or other add-on clause referring to hate crimes. If less embedded, 
standalone statutes were created to specifically address hate crimes and violations of civil rights. 
Jenness and Grattet theorize that the more embedded in existing law, the less policymakers have 
seriously approached the issue of hate crimes. Their categories, in order from most to least 
embedded in the law, are: Civil rights, Freestanding, Modifying, Coattailing, and Penalty 
Enhancement.  
In this thesis, I use “penalty enhancement” to refer to the meaning used by activists and 
journalists, unless otherwise specified. By this definition, 46 states have penalty enhancement 
laws—only Arkansas, Georgia, South Carolina, and Wyoming do not have them. 
States began passing legislation akin to penalty enhancement laws as early as 1961, when 
Illinois codified “ethnic intimidation” as a punishable offense. However, it was only in the late 
1970s to 1980s that states passed legislation specifically targeting bias motivation, as a result of 
activist groups pressuring policymakers. The majority of states passed laws in the early 1990s, 
following federal legislation. 
Protected Groups 
All of the 46 states with hate crime laws prosecute acts motivated by the victim’s race 
and religion. However, only 30 states prosecute hate crimes motivated by sexual orientation and 
disability. The number drops to 27 for crimes motivated by sex or gender, and 11 for gender 
identity. 
 19 
The numbers have changed over time. In 1989, only five states recognized crimes 
motivated by sexual orientation. In the five years following the 1990 federal Hate Crime 
Statistics Act, that number rose to 17. Of the 12 states that recognize gender identity, seven 
passed this legislation after 2009, when federal government legislation added this protected 
category. 
The amendments to protected groups reflect the fluid nature of hate crime as a legal 
concept, and the impact that national political trends have on state laws. The Matthew Shepard 
and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act was passed in 2009, as Congress and then-
President Barack Obama responded to nationwide advocacy for stronger hate crime laws. The act 
itself is partly named after a man, Matthew Shepard, whose murder was widely reported as 
motivated by his sexual orientation (Petersen 2011). 
Recent amendments to hate crime laws reflect another political trend. Since the 2014 
formation of the Blue Lives Matter movement, at least three states have added law enforcement 
officer as a protected group—Kentucky (Arab American Institute Foundation 2018), Louisiana 
and Mississippi. 
Additionally, penalty enhancement laws do not always cover the same protected groups 
as data collection laws. While New Jersey is one of the 12 states that includes gender identity in 
its penalty enhancement legislation, its data collection statute does not include gender identity in 
the categories it specifies. By contrast, Utah is the only state with penalty enhancement 
legislation that does not specify any protected categories—it just targets perpetrators who 
commit crimes with “the intent to intimidate or terrorize another person” (Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-203.3). Yet Utah’s data collection statute mandates records on crimes motivated by “race, 
religion, ancestry, national origin, ethnicity, or other categories that the division finds 
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appropriate.” Thus, what is prosecuted as a hate crime might not be recorded and reported to the 
FBI as such, depending on the state. 
Overall, hate crime laws in the US are used as political tools by a variety of advocacy 
groups across the political spectrum. By defining who is to be considered vulnerable, protected 
groups are one aspect of these tools—an aspect inconsistent across states and even categories of 
legislation. 
Prosecutable Crimes 
In addition to inconsistency regarding protected groups, hate crime legislation across 
states varies in the crimes it covers. By and large, state hate crime laws are written so that they 
can be applied to the same crimes as the Hate Crime Statistics Act covers: “murder, non-
negligent manslaughter; forcible rape; aggravated assault, simple assault, intimidation; arson; 
and destruction, damage or vandalism of property” (Congress.gov 2019). This means that 
penalty enhancement statutes can be used to increase sentences for crimes already prosecutable 
under other statutes in a state’s criminal code. 
However, there is variation. One of the starkest examples is Kentucky, a state with a 
history of lynching of African Americans (Ross & Hazel 2018). Kentucky’s penalty 
enhancement law does not use direct language to describe which crimes are prosecutable as hate 
crimes, but instead refers to 28 statutes by number. Interestingly, none of these 28 statutes cites 
homicide. Therefore, Kentucky as a state cannot prosecute murder as a hate crime—only 
localities with separate ordinances can do so. This nuance was covered by national news media 
in 2018, after the shooting of two African Americans near Louisville. The local police chief told 
media that the crime was racially motivated; however, state officials could not investigate the 
murder as a hate crime (Novelly 2018). 
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In addition, penalty enhancement laws vary in the magnitude they assign hate crimes. For 
some states, hate crimes are felonies; for others, misdemeanors. After the stabbing of three 
people on a Portland train in 2017, Oregon updated its hate crime penalty from a misdemeanor to 
felony in 2019 (Zimmerman 2019). While legislators have recently attempted to do the same in 
North Carolina, the state penalty enhancement remains a misdemeanor (Baumgartner Vaughan 
2019). 
Data Collection and Reporting 
As of 2019, 27 states and the District of Columbia have laws on data collection regarding 
hate crimes. 23 of these states mandate collection and reporting of hate crime data. The 
remaining 22 states have no data collection laws, despite 17 of them having passed penalty 
enhancement legislation for hate crimes. Therefore these 17 states, plus the five with data 
collection laws but no mandate to report, have penalty enhancement legislation but may not be 
reporting the same amount of crimes that they prosecute. 
Additionally, data collection laws define protected groups that may not be the same as 
those defined by penalty enhancement statutes. This is especially common among statutes that 
were passed at different times. California, for example, passed a data collection law that included 
gender as a protected category starting in 1997. Its penalty enhancement legislation, however, 
was not amended to include gender until 2004. By contrast, Florida added disability to protected 
groups under its penalty enhancement law in 1998, but the category remains absent under its data 
collection law. These inconsistencies can result in non-reporting of hate crimes that are 
prosecuted, if the individual is associated with certain protected categories absent in data 
collection statutes. 
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The overall number of states with data collection mandates is much less than that of 
states with penalty enhancement laws. However, the years in which the states passed data 
collection mandates are also clustered around the year 1990. This pattern also reflects advocacy 
groups’ work with policymakers in this period. 
In the case of 22 states, data reporting mandates are combined with data collection 
mandates. However, in five states, data collection legislation only mandates creation of a system 
for collection of statistics, and not reporting to the state or the FBI. In one state (Utah), there is 
no mandate for the creation of a data collection system, but a data reporting requirement exists. 
Police Training 
In general, state police training statutes can range from an overall requirement for annual 
training of some nature, to specifics on what and how law enforcement is trained on certain 
issues. Hate crimes, and recognizing bias motivation, are one of these issues. 15 states have 
legislation mandating police training on bias-motivated crimes, and an additional eight states and 
the District of Columbia have laws mandating some type of police training. 
Academics and journalists have identified police training as one of the key factors 
determining whether a hate crime is recognized, prosecuted, and reported to the FBI (Bell 2002, 
Thompson et. al. 2017). A glaring example is the murder of three youth in Chapel Hill, with 
which this thesis project began. There was evidence of anti-Muslim bias in the perpetrator’s 
interactions with Deah, Yusor and Razan. Yet the first statement released by the Chapel Hill 
police cited a parking dispute as the cause of the murders. The Chapel Hill police chief later 
apologized for his department’s premature characterization, but the damage was done. The 
narrative carried by local and national news is still impacted by the idea that a parking space—
not the victims’ faith—was the reason for their deaths (Barakat 2016). 
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While loosely clustered around 1990, the years in which states passed police training 
mandates were more spread out than those of the data collection and penalty enhancement laws. 
Multiple states passed police training legislation into the early 2000s. Maine has the most recent 
law, passed in 2017 (25 M.R.S. § 2803-B 2017). 
Statistics 
All of these differences are reflected in the statistics compiled by states and the FBI. 
States’ legislation has been shown to exert a significant effect on whether local law enforcement 
investigates and collects data on hate crimes. For example, the Kentucky’s particular penalty 
enhancement statute could be rendering murders, like the October 2018 shooting of two African 
Americans, invisible in the FBI’s statistics. 
In the case of Our Three Winners, North Carolina has a hate crime law, and there was 
clear evidence that Our Three Winners were targeted on the basis of their faith. Yet their murder 
was not prosecuted as a hate crime by the state. Their families were told that North Carolina’s 
ethnic intimidation law cannot be applied to first-degree murder (Abu-Salha 2019). State law 
only classifies hate crimes as misdemeanors — far short of the life sentence the murderer 
received. Parallel to the lack of penalty enhancement application, Chapel Hill police reported 
zero hate crimes for the year 2015. 
Several other prominent hate crime cases, including the murder of Khalid Jbarra in his 
Oklahoma driveway (Arab American Institute Foundation 2018), and shooting of Srinivas 
Kuchibhotla in a Kansas bar, were not prosecuted or recorded in FBI statistics (Fuchs 2018). 
These cases indicate that the FBI’s statistics do not represent reality. In addition to 
official data, independent organizations compile their own statistics, including ProPublica’s 
growing database of verified hate crime reports (McDevitt & Iwama 2016, Schwencke 2018). 
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ProPublica employs staff to verify the reports themselves—by contrast, there is no centralized 
verification of hate crime data collected by the FBI. 
Federal Data Collection System 
The FBI collects hate crime data from local law enforcement agencies under the Uniform 
Crime Reporting (UCR) program. The UCR includes data solicited via two subprograms: the 
Summary Reporting System (SRS), and the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation 2017). As previously mentioned, cases prosecuted by state and 
federal courts are not necessarily included in these reports. 
Founded with the UCR program in 1929, the SRS collects data on 13 types of offenses, 
including the crimes against persons and property specified by the Hate Crimes Statistics Act. 
NIBRS is more comprehensive, covering additional crimes from the former two categories, as 
well as crimes against society. As of 2019, 20 states currently have state-wide programs for local 
law enforcement agencies to submit incident and summary-level data to the FBI through NIBRS, 
as opposed to the SRS. 13 states submit summary data only, and 17 states submit incident data 
only. Mississippi is the only state that has no state NIBRS program (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation 2019). 
The inconsistency of states’ NIBRS use complicates any attempt to utilize UCR data to 
understand hate crimes at the national level, and compare between states (McDevitt & Iwama 
2016). Issues with misclassification and underreporting within the NIBRS system jeopardize the 
data’s accuracy. A study of select law enforcement agencies in West Virginia (Haas et. al. 2011) 
found that incidents with evidence of bias motivation were undercounted by approximately 67% 
(cited in McDevitt & Iwama 2016). 
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In addition, the FBI’s statistics program has evolved to recognize different protected 
groups since 1991. Obvious examples are gender identity, sexual orientation, and disability. The 
FBI added separate codes to account for anti-LGBTQ and ableist hate crimes, creating the 
opportunity for its data to represent violence against these protected groups (Criminal Justice 
Information Services [CJIS] Division 2015). 
A less obvious example is anti-Arab hate crimes. According to research by the Arab 
American Institute, the FBI introduced a category — Code 31 — for recording anti-Arab hate 
crimes in its statistics in 1991, but the code was technically invalid from 1992–2015 (Arab 
American Institute 2018). The FBI accepted submissions from local law enforcement agencies 
from 1992–2003, but did not report them in official statistics. In other words, the master files for 
each of these years contain Code 31 submissions, but these submissions are not included or 
considered in the FBI’s annual Hate Crime Statistics reports. The FBI reintroduced Code 31 in 
2015 (Arab American Institute Foundation 2018). 
The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) provides additional data on hate 
crimes in the US. Administered by the Bureau of Justice Statistics since 1972, the NCVS surveys 
approximately 49,000–76,000 households on their experiences with crime. The survey allows 
individuals to identify whether the crimes were bias motivated, instead of relying on police 
departments. The NCVS has several limitations (McDevitt & Iwama 2016), yet is nevertheless a 
useful tool for researchers. This project’s scope does not allow for an in-depth examination of the 
data, but mapping NCVS data is a future direction that would significantly supplement this 
study. 
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The overall number of reported hate crimes varies by year in the US, from 1991–2017. 
While reports increased by 12.5% from 2016–2017, the year 2001 still holds the highest number 
— 9,730. 
Over the years 1991–2017, the number of participating local agencies—and populations 
they cover—also varied. Participation in the UCR program climbed steeply in the early to mid-
1990s, leveling off to a more gradual increase from the late 1990s to 2017. Increases in 
participation mirror increases in reported hate crime counts from 2016–2017. 
Because local agencies are the FBI’s source of reporting, there is not a guarantee that hate 
crime prosecutions will be recorded in the data — nor that hate crime reports reflect successful 
prosecutions. As local agencies are permitted to exercise discretion when reporting hate crime 
cases to the FBI, their reports may not match court decisions. A ProPublica study examined 
Texas Judicial Branch records, concluding that of 981 hate crime cases reported by local 
agencies, only 5 were successfully prosecuted as hate crimes. The study lists four causes for this 
discrepancy, sourced from lawmakers, prosecutors, and other experts: a high burden of proof for 
hate crime convictions; individual prosecutors not pursuing hate crime charges; lack of police 
training; and lack of additional penalty enhancement available for some of the most violent cases 
(Katz 2017). 
In conclusion, legislation is only one of the many factors affecting hate crime reporting 
— and variations in legislation alone start to illustrate the complexities of federal data collection. 
There are different types of laws, including penalty enhancement, police training, and data 
collection and reporting mandates. These laws vary in the groups they apply to, and in their 
severity. They are linked to the FBI’s data collection system via their political context, their 
legislators, and the agencies they impact. However, their impact on the FBI’s hate crime data 
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may not be directly evident in statistical tests or individual cases. Legislation, however, remains 
a critical part of policymakers’ and advocacy groups’ attempts to address bias-motivated 
violence in the US (US Commission on Civil Rights 2019). Therefore, understanding the impacts 
— and lack thereof — of legislation on federal data collection is imperative for understanding 




















CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Situated in criminology and sociology literature, US-focused hate crime scholarship 
draws on numerous concepts to explain the construction and occurrence of hate crimes. These 
frameworks include group threat perspective, opportunity-based perspective, power-differential 
perspective (Disha et. al. 2011), social constructionist approach and political mediation theory 
(McVeigh et. al. 2003), safe neighborhoods theory (Iwama 2018), homogenization and 
differentiation (Grattet et. al. 1998), defended communities perspective (Iwama 2016), social 
disorganization perspective (Iwama 2016), and a typology of hate crime law (Jenness & Grattet 
2001). These theories offer rich conceptual frameworks for understanding hate crime statistics. 
Additionally, their corresponding studies are invaluable for understanding the US legal and 
sociopolitical systems comprising hate crimes. Building upon this knowledge, this project 
focuses on how spatial and critical race theory approaches can inform our approach to hate crime 
statistics. 
Critical Race Theory and Geography 
Geographers Minelle Mahtani (2014), Laura Pulido (2002), and Patricia Price (2010) 
note our discipline’s lack of engagement with race and racism, a product of what Pulido terms 
the “overwhelming whiteness of the field” (2002). This lack of engagement was particularly 
visible as I searched for conceptual tools for engaging with hate crimes from an explicitly spatial 
perspective. Similar to the paucity of geography work on gender and law noted by Cuomo and 
Brickell (2019), recent reviews of legal geography scholarship reflect minimal analysis of race 
and law (Delaney 2015, Delaney 2016, Delaney 2017). Studies engaging race do so in the 
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capacity of empirical context—such as the Bus Riders Union in Los Angeles (Delaney 
2016)—and not with a focus on how laws in the US are structurally entwined with concepts of 
race. Thus, compared to its position as a driving analytical concept in critical race theory 
scholarship, race holds a more incidental analytical value in reviews of legal geography 
scholarship. The category of race is mentioned when relevant to the specific contexts of legal 
geography studies, but the primary analytical frameworks revolve around “material sites of law” 
(p. 268) including property and courtrooms (Delaney 2016). However, Pulido and Price’s 
engagements with critical race theory (CRT) illustrate the possibilities for using CRT in spatial 
analyses, especially of phenomena affected by race and racism. My study focuses on race as a 
fundamental—but shifting—concept informing hate crime legislation and statistics in the US. As 
such, critical race theory as engaged by geographers offers vital conceptual tools for analysis. 
This section brings into conversation hate crime studies, critical race theory, and geography 
scholarship. 
Studies of hate crime utilize tools of critical legal studies, such as approaching the law as 
constituted by surrounding sociopolitical landscapes (McVeigh, Welch & Bjarnason 2003). 
However, few studies specifically draw from a critical race theory approach, emphasizing the 
role of race in varied access to justice in hate crime cases.  
Legal scholar Jeannine Bell’s work is a notable exception (Delgado & Stefancic 2007), as 
she draws a detailed picture of the daily operations of a police department handling hate crime 
cases. Bell notes gaps in social science and legal scholarship, which fails to consider the on-the-
ground realities affecting how hate crimes are produced and prosecuted (2002, p. 25). She 
highlights how a wider landscape of racialized injustice in the US constitutes an influential 
barrier to hate crime cases at every step: 
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“The most significant of these barriers [to hate crime cases] consists of the political consequences for 
labeling an incident a hate crime. Policing hatred is a form of policing the community as police officers 
arrest members of the White majority for assaults and property damage done to minorities. The 'politics of 
hate' influences nearly every stage of the process, including what gets reported, the help the unit receives to 
investigate incidents, whether witnesses come forward, whether community and City Hall pressure the unit 
to investigate or not to investigate, and finally, the action the district attorney will take on a case. If an 
incident makes it through the investigation process without being dropped or classified as unfounded, it 
must then make it over a different set of hurdles when prosecutors and the courts come into play” (2002, 
pp. 8-9). 
While police decision-making remains her main disciplinary focus, Bell’s analysis 
provides rich ground for using racialized injustice to contextualize hate crime laws and statistics. 
Through portraying the everyday details of how law enforcement manages hate crime cases, Bell 
forges connections across different scales: neighborhood politics, individual law enforcement 
agencies, courts, and national statistics systems and political trends. This multi-scale analysis 
provides a fuller illustration of the tangible systems that create hate crimes: 
“As a study of how hate crime law is enforced, this book provides a wide-angled view of the system out of 
which actual hate crime charges emerge. This system includes those in the criminal justice system—police, 
prosecutors, judges and juries—as well as residents of the communities in which these incidents take place, 
members of the advocacy community, and the news media. 27 Each of these actors has some role in 
making hate crime. By capturing the struggles and the influence of all of these actors, this book is also a 
description of politics and, ultimately, power—the power of police to define racism, anti-Semitism, and 
antigay and -lesbian bias, the powerlessness of victims, and the power of communities allied against the 
enforcement of laws designed to protect victims' civil rights” (2002, pp. 26-27). 
While not explicitly related to geographers’ scholarship, Bell’s work is reminiscent of 
theoretical trends within critical and feminist geography. Her multi-scale analysis, while not 
explicitly spatial, makes connections across several different spatial scales to determine how 
power works—an examination advocated by scholars of feminist geopolitics. Similarly, Bell’s 
approach to hate crimes as a system—a system that affects all individuals involved, and is 
informed by racism and bias pervading in society beyond just hate crimes—echoes Pulido and 
DeLara’s spatial approach to the Black Radical Tradition (BRT) outlined by Cedric Robinson 
(Pulido & DeLara 2018). This focus allows connections between different systems that function 
through constructs-turned-lived-realities, such as race and other biases, to separate and subjugate 
individuals. As Pulido uses BRT to draw connections between the spatialized spectacular and 
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environmental racisms of the Trump administration, such could BRT frameworks be used to 
draw connections between the racism that impacts hate crime laws and their enforcement, and 
other manifestations of racism within the same US political and legal systems. Such a multi-scale 
approach spatializes and visualizes connections for a richer and further grounded understanding 
of the everyday workings of complex systems that enact violence. 
Neil Nunn provides a similar framework for connecting broader toxic geographies and 
hate: they are at once “invisible, corrosive, mundane, with materialities ranging from the vitriolic 
words that speak the language of sociogenic hate (Fanon 2008; see also Lorde 1993), to the 
spraying of DDT" (2018, p. 1333). In his example, the spraying of DDT could easily be 
substituted with the uneven possibilities for retribution in the face of hate crimes. Applying CRT 
frameworks, Megan Ybarra juxtaposes hate crimes with state-sanctioned violence (deportation), 
throwing into question the legal divisions drawn between private and state perpetrators (Ybarra 
2019, p. 211). 
Critiques of Hate Crime Laws 
Drawing such spatialized connections through engagements with CRT also offers a 
response to questions raised regarding the use of hate crime laws to address violence against 
minorities (Kohn 2001, Lamble 2008, Loewen 2014, Meyer 2014). Spade and Willse, legal and 
cultural studies scholars, respectively, contend that: 
“…the rhetoric of hate crimes activism isolates specific instances of violence against queer and 
transgender people, categorizing these as acts of individual prejudice, and obscures an understanding 
of the systemic, institutional nature of gender and sexuality subordination” (2000, p. 39). 
In this obfuscation of structural oppression, hate crime legislation strips the historical 
context from racial categories:  
“…the legal deployment of identity categories effectively erases the historical and cultural specificity of 
racial categories, rendering "race" a neutral signifier. In this formation, a racially motivated crime 
committed by a black person against a white person carries the same meaning as a crime committed by a 
white person against a black person” (Spade & Willse 2000, p. 47). 
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Spade contends that hate crime and anti-discrimination laws, in not taking into account 
whether victims are from historically marginalized groups, evoke a “colorblindness” that has 
been weaponized against such groups. In his view, this colorblindness “undermines the 
possibility of remedying the severe racial disparities in the United States that are rooted in 
slavery, genocide, land theft, internment, and immigration exclusion, as well as racially explicit 
policies that historically and presently exclude people of color from the benefits of wealth-
building programs for US citizens like Social Security, land grants, and credit and other 
homeownership support” (Spade 2012). 
While the concept of hate crime is a legal tool to address violence against minorities, 
focusing on it has the potential to whitewash the violent context of the US’ foundation, “forged 
through slavery and colonization” (Pulido et. al. 2019, p. 528). The past and current systemic 
injustices faced by minorities do not weigh as a factor in penalty enhancements for hate crime. 
The impacts of systemic injustice are thus made invisible in hate crime prosecutions, with laws 
applying penalty enhancements equally across all protected categories (race, religion, sexuality, 
etc.). This equal application is irrespective of whether the crime was driven by bias linked to 
exclusionary and racist logics that have long been supported by the US state—or whether it was 
committed against law enforcement officers or members of a majority. “[A]nti-white”, “anti-
Protestant”, and “anti-Male” categories are all accorded individual bias motivation codes by the 
FBI (as opposed to anti-straight and anti-cis gender, which do not have codes) (Criminal Justice 
Information Services [CJIS] Division 2015). 
Two Supreme Court cases illustrate the application of hate crime law as relates to 
historically marginalized groups. In the 1992 case R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, a group of 
teenagers burned a cross on the lawn of an African American family. The teenagers were 
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charged with violation of St. Paul’s Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, which prohibited symbols 
arousing “anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or 
gender” (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul). While the trial court dismissed the case, the state supreme 
court found the perpetrators guilty. R.A.V., one of the perpetrators, petitioned the Supreme 
Court, claiming the ordinance violated First Amendment constitutional rights. In a unanimous 
decision, the Supreme Court found the law in violation of the First Amendment. Penning the 
majority opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the ordinance was unconstitutional because “it 
prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses” (R. 
A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 [1992]). In his view, the ordinance amounted to viewpoint 
discrimination—and the city “has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight 
freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.” 
A very different decision was reached in a 1993 hate crime case involving an African 
American man who attacked a white man. After watching a film depicting anti-Black violence, 
defendant Tom Mitchell instigated the severe beating of a young white boy who was on the same 
street as Mitchell and his friends. Mitchell was charged with a racially motivated hate crime 
under Wisconsin’s penalty enhancement statute. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the 
statute violated First Amendment rights because of the enhanced penalty it places on bigoted 
beliefs—in this case, the perpetrator’s motive for choosing the victim. 
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court found the law was not in violation of the 
First Amendment. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion, stating that while “the 
ordinance struck down in R. A. V. was explicitly directed at expression (i.e., "speech" or 
"messages"), the statute in this case is aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment” 
(Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 [1993]). Although statutes prohibiting cross-burning exist 
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in x states, the opinion here clearly shows that the Supreme Court drew a line between punishing 
expression, and punishing expression leading to physical violence. Legal scholar Richard 
Delgado found the two cases evident of a shift in Supreme Court approaches to the First 
Amendment, citing a transition from “First Amendment formalism to First Amendment realism” 
(1994). However, it is interesting that this shift was provoked by a case of anti-white hate crime, 
and the legalized expression of anti-Black sentiment was cited in the majority opinion. 
The individualized framework of hate crime also has the potential to narrow down what 
violence is addressed as unjust, and prevent us from drawing connections between different types 
of violence. This potential is illustrated by Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s 
questioning of the FBI counterterrorism staff in Congress. She highlighted a “double standard” 
under which crimes committed by Muslim American perpetrators have been charged as domestic 
terrorism, but those by American white supremacists—including the Charleston church and Tree 
of Life Synagogue shootings—were charged as hate crimes. The FBI counterterrorism division’s 
assistant director, Michael McGarrity, responded by saying that the discrepancy was due to the 
Muslim perpetrators’ being associated with a foreign organization, a legal requirement for 
prosecuting the crime as a terrorist incident. “Is white supremacy not a global issue?” Ocasio-
Cortez countered (The Guardian 2019). 
When have hate crimes been framed as domestic terrorism? When have the perpetrators 
received the same systemic vilification as Muslims in the US post-9/11? In the US, the word 
“terrorism” has been associated with Brown and Black people since the 1960s, when the FBI 
first started monitoring Muslim groups for fear of violence (Curtis 2013, Beydoun 2018). 
Through its Countering Violent Extremism program (2014–), the US federal government has 
given private organizations immense funds to address terrorism—that is, terrorism committed by 
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Muslims. Life After Hate, the sole participating organization that received funding to address 
domestic white extremist groups, lost its funding in early 2017 (Allen-Ebrahimian 2017, Beinart 
2018). 
While the case has been made against expanding the US’ military industrial complex to 
fight white supremacist groups (Abrahms 2019), Ocasio-Cortez offers a significant disruption to 
frameworks conventionally used to address different types of violence in the US. By referring to 
hate crimes as domestic terrorism, Ocasio-Cortez opens the door to using a concept—
terrorism—that has primarily been used to criminalize Black and Brown people, to address the 
violence embedded in the foundation of the US. To more fully consider the implication of 
prosecuting violence motivated by characteristics that make a victim vulnerable, due to the 
interaction of systemic discrimination and individual bias. To recognize that the violence of hate 
crimes, as we know them today, laces through our history and landscape, stitching a foundation 
for our economy, society, and legal structures. To recognize that injustice is embedded in the 
law, as much as the law is now being used to address injustice. And to hold these two tensions, 
sit with them, and decide how they will inform future attempts to address violence and injustice. 
The strength of using geography with CRT is the potential to draw spatial connections 
between violences at different scales and manifestations. By recognizing laws as both lived 
realities and products of the surrounding political environment, geographic engagements with 
critical race theory can more freely and critically question cases of violence and injustice.  
Visualizing Critical Approaches 
Critical visualization of data provides a vital tool for drawing such spatial connections. 
Juxtaposing statistics with qualitative data—such as the cases these statistics lack—can 
illuminate gaps in the statistics. When represented cartographically, combining layers of data 
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helps draw connections across space and scale, to better understand what this data can show 
about grounded, lived realities. Both feminist GIS and critical approaches to data—including 
data visualization—present conceptual frameworks through which to draw such connections. 
The 1990s saw skepticism from critical geographers toward GIS, or Geographic 
Information Systems. Human geographers questioned the potential impact of quantitative 
approaches to geospatial information, urging caution toward technologies that could enable 
policy decisions based on dangerous abstract representations of complex spatial processes. 
Feminist GIS arose to question the binary divide between GIS and critical human geography, 
criticizing the lack of discourse between human geographers and geographers using GIS for 
mainly quantitative purposes. Feminist geography scholars developed theoretical approaches to 
geospatial applications that highlight the inequities such applications can bridge, as well as 
perpetuate. 
Critical approaches to quantitative data have developed across and outside of various 
academic disciplines. These academics and activists work in the fields ranging across 
environmental justice, data sovereignty, data justice, data activism, data resistance, geography, 
human-computer interaction, and digital humanities. They address issues from the simple 
preservation of data, such as the DataRescue movement, to questioning how data is collected and 
constructed. Feminist and critical data visualization addresses their questions, balancing the 
function of visualization with information traditionally omitted in abstraction of quantitative 
data. 
Following, I summarize both approaches, and then reflect on their applications in 




Feminist GIS frameworks for geovisualization undergird this project’s theoretical and 
practical approaches to the maps and graphics created from hate crime data. In her introduction 
to a 2002 special issue of Gender, Place and Culture, geographer Mei-Po Kwan questions 
feminist critiques of GIS as empiricist: 
“It is important that feminist critics consider GIS methods—or, more precisely, the mode of knowledge 
production enabled by GIS—to be positivist and masculinist. In light of these criticisms, it is crucial to re-
examine the link between GIS methods and positivist/masculinist epistemology (and ontology), and to ask 
whether GIS methods are inherently positivist, universalizing, and unable to be used to understand 
difference (without denying that particular GIS applications can be positivist)” (Kwan 2002a). 
Feminist GIS arose from critical discourse in geography in the 1990s, as geographers 
advocated for interrogations of the binaries and hierarchies that shaped quantitative, positivist 
spatial analysis. This critical geography discourse developed alongside feminist geographers’ 
critiques of science and technology, as well as their possibilities for disrupting binary categories 
and hierarchies of power (Haraway 1990), and as feminists called for broader frameworks of 
inclusion within and outside of geography research (Rose 1993). Calls for feminist GIS came 
just a year after calls for a feminist geopolitics, reacting to the still-disembodied views feminist 
geographers found present in critical geopolitics literature (Dowler and Sharp 2001, Hyndman 
2001). 
In her 2002 introduction, Kwan echoes her fellow authors’ opinions that “feminist 
engagement in the material and discursive de/reconstruction of dominant GIS practices can lead 
to critical practices that are congenial to feminist epistemologies and politics” (2002a, p. 262). 
Expounding on feminism and GIS in her article of the same issue, Kwan extends Gillian Rose’s 
(2001) work on critical visual methodologies to GIS, (2002b, p. 271). She calls for using GIS as 
a point of departure toward “the power of the oppositional discourse” in the vein of Gibson-
Graham (1994).  
 38 
Kwan musters feminist critiques of critical discourse of the 1990s, claiming this critical 
discourse foreclosed opportunities for feminist engagement with GIS. She asks whether GIS is 
an “inherently masculinist technology or social practice,” and how researchers’ subjectivities 
impact their use of GIS (2002b, p. 275). Kwan emphasizes that qualitative digital data can be 
incorporated into GIS, subverting the view imposed by critical geographers that GIS must be 
exclusively used for quantitative analysis. Drawing on feminist reflexivities, she highlights the 
importance of locating GIS researchers within the web of power relations inherent to academia 
and its research subjects—and contextualizing quantitative, secondary data through qualitative, 
ethnographic methods. 
Kwan, as well as the other three authors included in the issue, explores the 
“representational possibilities of GIS” (2002b, p. 273). The issue arises in their discussion of 
informal economies in post-Soviet Moscow (Pavlovskaya 2002), women’s activism around 
breast cancer in Long Island (McLafferty 2002), and most especially in Nadine Schuurman and 
Geraldine Pratt’s feminist critique of critical geography discourse around GIS (2002). 
Responding to Pickles’ (1993) use of Haraway to critique GIS, Schuurman asserts that 
Haraway’s opposition to the masculinist, quantitative analysis paired with GIS technology does 
not foreclose the possibility of feminist researchers appropriating GIS to disrupt binaries and 
hierarchies. Instead, she argues, “following Haraway, our objective is not just to criticise science, 
but to transform it through situated, knowledgeable, specific conversations about the coding and 
objectification of the world, and about the power-laden particularities of this coding” (2000, p. 
297). 
Also at issue are the possibilities that GIS brings for multi-scale analysis. Kwan (2002c) 
and Pavlovskaya (2002) both cite the ability that GIS lends to researchers to incorporate multiple 
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layers of data, and visually illuminate links between the experiences of women and marginalized 
groups at different spatial scales. Pavlovskaya states that were researchers to compile this visual 
data manually, it would be very time-consuming or impossible (p. 284). Kwan agrees, writing 
“as GIS is capable of displaying and overlaying many layers of data, it can be used to reveal 
spatial contexts, depict spatial connections, and hint at the complex social relationships among 
people and places. The strength of GIS methods lies in helping the user/researcher to identify 
complex relationships across geographical scales” (2002c p. 650). Their thought fits in with—
and may reflect, although it does not cite—calls for a feminist geopolitics that enable multi-scale 
analysis through linking everyday experiences and large-scale, international political events 
(Dowler and Sharp 2001, Hyndman 2001). The use of GIS would likely enable or enhance this 
feminist geopolitical analysis, but the only GIS-like methodology I have found in my focus on 
feminist geopolitics is participatory mapping and research à la Rachel Pain (Pain et. al. 2006, 
Pain et. al. 2010). 
Writing three years after the GPC issue that initially called for bridging feminist theory 
and GIS, Sara McLafferty identifies a growing “feminization” of GIS (2005). After discussing 
feminist perspectives on technology more broadly, she calls for greater engagement with the 
impact of GIS on activism, everyday life and gendered identities. She uses the term “gendered 
construction of GIS” (p. 38) to describe how feminist and human geography critiques have 
approached GIS as masculinist (Bondi and Domosh 1992). In conclusion, McLafferty takes a 
stance congruent with her 2002 Gender, Place and Culture article, in which she acknowledges 
the growing impact of GIS technologies on diverse aspects of life and calls for more of the same 
analysis. As she notes in her 2002 article, human geographers’ critiques of GIS did little to quell 
the growth of its use in research, but her call for more engagement with — rather than against — 
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GIS is a step for feminist geographers in building bridges and challenging hierarchies across the 
discipline of geography. 
In a 2006 guest editorial for Environment and Planning A, Kwan and LaDona Knigge 
introduce four papers in the issue, all addressing qualitative uses of GIS in research, both in 
theory and on community development and planning. Pavlovskaya writes on potential 
intersections between critical geography and GIS (2006). She takes up the question of 
epistemology in her paper, viewing the quantitative/qualitative split in the discipline of 
geography as “an extension of different epistemologies” (p. 2003). Instead of bringing feminist 
theory to bridge this divide, as her 2002 article does, she claims that GIS, quantitative methods, 
and qualitative approaches are part of a continuum of scientific research rather than oppositional 
binaries. She does so in order to disrupt the seemingly unmovable association between GIS and 
quantitative methods, and create openings for qualitative analysis with GIS. Instead of 
completely disregarding quantitative methods and GIS, a tendency of 1990s critical geography 
scholarship, Pavlovskaya disentangles GIS from quantitative methods in order to encourage 
critical geographers to engage with the former. She asserts that GIS provides diverse ways to 
rethink spatial relationships, in that “spatial relationships are always implied in GIS data 
structures but their understanding and analysis should not be limited to and by positivist 
frameworks” (p. 2015). 
In a chapter for Elwood and Cope’s 2009 book, Qualitative GIS: A Mixed Methods 
Approach to Integrating Qualitative Research and Geographic Information Systems, 
Pavlovskaya continues to refer to the rich potential for research stemming from possible 
intersections between GIS and critical geography. While she cites feminist geographers’ 
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significant contribution to the development of qualitative research, it is on critical geography 
more broadly that she places emphasis as she discusses qualitative uses for GIS. 
From a more theoretical perspective, Agnieszka Leszczynski and Sarah Elwood explore 
feminist theory’s relationship to current spatial media in general (2015). Like Pavlovskaya, they 
situate feminist GIS literature within critical GIS, and link it to critical studies of ICT 
(Information and Computer Technology). Using OpenStreetMap (OSM) as a case study, 
Leszczynski and Elwood discuss the inherently gendered process of data collection, highlighting 
the exclusion of particular gendered place names like child care from the OSM amenities key (p. 
17). They continue, to critique the use of geospatial technology in two dating apps that could 
enable “potentially predatory behavior” (p. 19), and assert that “the vernacular and mobile nature 
of spatial media means that they are deeply embedded in the spaces and practices of the 
everyday” (p. 25). Their work emphasizes the need for critical geographers in general to include 
gender in analyses of spatial media—and by extension, other categories including race. 
Elwood and Leszczynski’s 2018 article on feminist digital geographies keeps an explicit 
emphasis on feminist theory as a tool to reconsider a variety of subdisciplines related to data 
visualization. They trace feminist geography as central to the development of critical GIS, and 
extend the former’s original focus on gender, to its potential to bridge a variety of exclusions 
within geography and research. Elwood and Leszczynski critique the ongoing whiteness of 
digital studies, citing McKittrick’s (2016) point on the absence of consideration for black and 
postcolonial feminists, as well as queer theory and queer code/space. 
Critical Approaches to Data and Data Visualization 
While Kwan and her contemporaries focused on qualitative data in their feminist 
approaches to GIS, there are a myriad of critical, activist and decolonizing approaches to 
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quantitative data as well. Expanding on discussions within feminist GIS and related disciplines, 
Catherine D'Ignazio and Lauren Klein discuss links between feminism, and GIS and other social 
science/humanities disciplines using technology (2016). In addition to GIS, they incorporate 
feminist perspectives from digital humanities, human-computer interactions, and science and 
technology studies. With the term “feminist data visualization,” they claim that “a feminist 
approach to data visualization, while centered on design, insists that data, design, and community 
of use, are inextricably intertwined” (second page). D’Ignazio and Klein thus advocate for 
challenging of strict categories and binaries when compiling data and creating visualizations. 
They claim that visualizations could be enriched by consideration of embodied and affective 
experiences when compiling data, as well as consideration of the multiple and fluid experiences 
possible when utilizing data visualizations. 
D’Ignazio and Klein highlight six more critical and comprehensive visualizations. These 
questions are categorized under six feminist data visualization principles: 1) Rethink binaries, 2) 
Embrace pluralism, 3) Examine power/aspire to empowerment, 4) Consider context, 5) 
Legitimize embodiment and affect, and 6) Make labor visible. 
For each of these principles, D’Ignazio and Klein stipulate questions to make design 
processes and outputs (visualization) more critical and comprehensive. The questions center 
around issues of power, representation, and labor. For example, under “Rethink binaries”, one 
design process question is, “What categories have we taken for granted?” Corresponding design 
output questions ask, “How do we communicate the limits of our categories in the final 
representation? How can we allow the user to refactor the categories we have presented for 
view?” 
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Other questions about the data include who is excluded by certain categorizations, whose 
view of the world a visualization represents, how information about the data (metadata) will be 
preserved, and whether a visualization can empower a certain community. For the latter, 
D’Ignazio and Klein question whether access always empowers. This question parallels 
participatory research debates on when making community information accessible can hurt 
communities. One example of this problematic is a map created by neo-Nazi groups in 2015, 
showing all of the refugee housing in Germany. This map could certainly be used to measure 
access to health care facilities, etc., for inhabitants; but its publication on Google Maps (by a 
certain group) makes the housing vulnerable to violent attacks. Another example is a map 
compiled by United Kingdom charities with information on houseless European Union nationals, 
which was viewed and used by the Home Office to deport non-citizens in 2017 (Bliss 2019, 
Townsend 2017). 
The questions raised by D’Ignazio and Klein give way to a broader set of concerns 
around not only data visualization, but ethics and data itself (Bernardi 2018, Heidaripour & 
Forlano 2018, Roth et al. 2017). Concerns include the invisibility of those not directly involved 
in the design and dissemination of data visualizations—both those who helped compile the data, 
as well as those impacted by policy decisions made from it (Correll 2019). The authority and 
supposed neutrality of data sets themselves, and visualizations created from them, hold highly 
problematic in their abstraction of the complicated situations they attempt to reflect (Dalton & 
Thatcher 2014). Yet there are tensions between the need to approach data critically, and the need 
to produce visualizations that are legible to communities (Correll 2019). While complex 
visualizations may be more ideal for representing complex realities, they increase the level of 
visualization literacy required to understand them. The Anti-Eviction Mapping Project is an 
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example of a digital humanities-oriented initiative that addresses this divide. The visualizations 
and media produced by the project are community-oriented. They use quantitative and 
qualitative data to document and problematize gentrification, while remaining legible to 
community members without expertise in design or data visualization (Anti-Eviction Mapping 
Project 2019). 
Scholarship on data justice also engages with broader considerations about how data is 
compiled and represented. Part of this literature focuses on countering the potential injustices 
that data-gathering technologies perpetuate, including surveillance of social justice activists and 
uneven development internationally (Dencik et al. 2019, Heeks 2017, Johnson 2014, Taylor 
2017). However, an environmental data justice framework, as conceptualized by the 
Environmental Data and Governance Initiative (EDGI), approaches data as a tool for activism by 
and empowering marginalized communities (Vera et al. 2018, p. 518). 
Formed in response to the disappearance of ecological and environmental data under the 
Trump administration, EDGI’s goal of data resistance aims to “develop new data infrastructures 
and technological strategies as tools of opposition to the Trump administration and to a longer 
legacy of inadequate and unevenly enforced environmental data and governance practices in the 
United States” (Vera et al. 2018, p. 512). Its initial DataRescue project included downloading 
and archiving data from government websites, as well as documenting changes in wording and 
data availability on said websites. The initiative partners with several organizations that, while 
critiquing uses of data that perpetuate inequities, work with communities to develop data 
collection methods and technology that address community needs. These organizations include 
the Technoscience Research Institute at the University of Toronto, and the Sunlight Foundation, 
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which engages with “civic technologies, open data, policy analysis and journalism” to push for 
government transparency (Sunlight Foundation 2019). 
While EDGI members stipulate the initiative has never taken the neutrality of data for 
granted, EDGI recognized the DataRescue project did not “address broader questions about why 
federal agencies collected these data in the first place and how they currently use them” (Walker 
et al. 2018, p. 3). With a critical approach to data in mind, EDGI turned to Data Together, a 
partnership initiative facilitating community archiving of data. Data Together explores both 
“how communities can hold copies of data that represent them or that are used in decision-
making about them,” as well as “the question of what community means, and how it might work 
in exclusionary or homogenising ways” (Walker et al. p. 8). 
EDGI cites a long history of environmental justice activists and scholars, who have 
questioned the assumptions inherent in quantitative government data collection (Vera et al. p. 
523, Louisiana Bucket Brigade 2019), and worked for community stewardship of environmental 
information. There exist similar initiatives that arose out of issues with the FBI’s collection of 
data. The Anti-Defamation League, Southern Poverty Law Center (Jendryke & McClure 2019), 
and Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) (2019) all collect their own data on bias 
incidents. CAIR solicits information from US Muslim communities, and compiles reports of bias 
incidents ranging from state-sponsored racial and religious profiling, to violent crimes. Journalist 
outlet ProPublica works with local newsrooms across the US to collect reports of hate crimes 
(2019). The Mapping Islamophobia project, based at Grinnell College, collects media-verified 
reports of bias incidents against Muslims and those perceived as Muslims (Mapping 
Islamophobia 2019).  
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After the deaths of Our Three Winners, UNC students mobilized to develop a web 
platform collecting local reports of Islamophobia. Project Mawla aims to “provide a safe space 
that empowers private citizens by way of education, data analysis and reporting” (Project Mawla 
2019). Citing experience with court cases, project lead Hamza Butler emphasized the importance 
of documenting Islamophobia incidents within a space created by and for Muslim communities. 
Reports are downloadable as PDFs, if victims wish to submit them to local police. Speaking 
about the project, Butler addressed the systemic facets of Islamophobia, asserting that “No 
matter how seemingly small the discrimination is, it’s still connected to this larger institution or 
system of violence. For some people, it might just be a slur and for others, it may be a bullet in 
the head, but at the end of the day these are not isolated incidents” (Ellenburg 2016). 
A similar attempt to address marginalization with data is seen in the Data 4 Black Lives 
project, a data science initiative that seeks to counter harmful instrumentalization of data such as 
predictive policing and risk-based sentencing. Asserting that now “discrimination is a high-tech 
enterprise,” the project’s mission is “using data science to create concrete and measurable change 
in the lives of Black people” (Data 4 Black Lives 2019). At their first conference in 2017, 
founder Yeshimabeit Milner reflected on lived dichotomies between Blackness and tech. 
Speaking on response to the project, Milner stated “There were so many black scientists, people 
working in tech companies and laboratories who are passionate about science but don’t know 
how to get involved—or, if they’re black, don’t know how to reconcile their identity as a black 
person and a scientist because they’ve been told to [mutually] exclude the two” (Johnson 2019). 
Milner’s comment evokes the colonial aspect of data—the ways data were used to aid 
and enforce imperial and colonial missions. This stretches from the military applications of 
geography and cartography (Barnes & Farish 2006, Driver 2001, Jazeel 2016), to geographically 
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situated health data collected from enslaved people of African descent in the US (Washington 
2006). The concept of contemporary data colonization parallels some data justice scholarship’s 
pushback against datafication, with an additional emphasis on the coloniality of data as currently 
used by government and corporate actors. “[A]n expression of the coloniality of power 
manifested as the violent imposition of ways of being, thinking, and feeling,” data colonization 
forecloses opportunities for imagining alternative social organization (Ricaurte 2019, p. 351). 
Projects that increase citizen control over the collection of data are invoked to highlight the need 
for “technological sovereignty and data agency” (Ricaurte 2019, p. 361 citing Kennedy et al. 
2015)—which in turn complicate the categories and conceptual frameworks used to create data 
collection systems. 
The concept of Indigenous data sovereignty illustrates alternatives to data colonization. 
Much data sovereignty literature focuses on complications to modern nation-states’ and 
corporations’ control over data storage, introduced by cloud computing (Amoore 2018, De 
Filippi & McCarthy 2012, Irion 2012, Peterson et al. 2011). However, scholarship on Indigenous 
data sovereignty illuminates the potential for using the idea of sovereignty to explore different 
conceptualizations of data (Kukutai & Taylor 2016, Rainie et al. 2017, Carroll et al. 2019). This 
scholarship addresses hegemonic views of the definition and value of data, in that “information 
that does not originate in or is not validated by Western constructs is rejected or coopted at best, 
and destroyed at worst” (Rodriguez-Lonebear 2016, p. 254). Considering centuries-old 
Indigenous data challenges the conceptualization of data as modern, and irrelevant to Indigenous 
populations (p. 255). 
This disruption in how data is viewed applies to other populations long portrayed by 
colonial powers, and now US and Europe-based media, as unmodern and underdeveloped. As 
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Rodriguez-Lonebear asserts, “concept of data is imbued with a host of meanings within and 
across contexts,” where for Indigenous communities in the US, data have a “contentious history 
tied to the survival of native peoples on one hand, and to the instruments of the coloniser on the 
other” (p. 257). A similar observation could be made about communities in the Middle East and 
Africa, where data on local geographies have long facilitated survival, yet have also been 
instrumentalized by European colonizers and US military personnel to secure access to resources 
and territory (Asad 1973, Asad 1986, Davis 2019, Duvall et al. 2019, Gregory 2004). 
Rodriguez-Lonebear cites a conversation with a tribal leader that echoes my own 
conversation with a local activist, which sparked this project on hate crimes. “We need data!” the 
leader is quoted saying, emphasizing the need for quantitative demographic data to effect 
changes to tribal policy—changes sensitive to contemporary citizenship concerns. His need is for 
“unbiased data,” which encompasses social and political categories relevant to his context (2016, 
p. 266-267). While it could be argued that no data is unbiased, his need is driven by pragmatism, 
not idealistic empiricism: He needs quantitative data collected via agreed-upon methods, which 
would be viewed by other tribal leaders as less biased than his personal opinion or anecdotal 
evidence. In the context of data decolonization, the concept of unbiased data is informed by 
stakeholders’ involvement and perceptions. 
Critical Approaches to Visualizing Hate Crime Data 
What visualizations could come from decolonizing and activist approaches to data? One 
approach is simply visualizing information not frequently present in school curricula and mass 
media (Bonilla & Hantel 2016). “Tools of inquiry” are created with such visualizations, and used 
to question commonly accepted concepts like sovereignty (Bonilla & Hantel 2016). Visualizing 
complex longitudinal and spatial data, such as a century of US land acquisitions, can increase 
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accessibility of the information held in the data (Saunt & Bernardes 2019, Tufte & Robins 1997). 
This alone could be considered part of a decolonizing approach to data, as it privileges 
accessibility of information that is omitted in consistent disenfranchisement of communities 
marginalized by colonial situations (Coates 2019). 
The FBI’s quantitative hate crime data is both longitudinal and spatial, and certainly 
represents complexity beyond its ability to fully encompass. Even mapping its inconsistencies 
across space is consistent with principles of feminist and critical approaches to data visualization. 
At the county level, there is vast spatial variation in the number of years agencies participate, 
reported hate crime rate, and percent of population covered by reporting agencies. These 
categories can be flipped to visualize gaps — examining the average years agencies have not 
reported, the percent of agencies not reporting, and the percent of agencies (and population 
covered) only submitting reports of zero. 
Another approach to visualization is incorporating narrative to complement quantitative 
data. The Arab American Foundation Institute’s 2018 report on hate crimes cites three cases of 
hate crimes not recorded in the FBI’s master files, including Our Three Winners. Maps of hate 
crime rates from the year of these cases, combined with an image and a few sentences about 
them, counteracts the quantitative data collection process that makes them invisible. 
Geovisualizing hate crime laws illuminates another part of the data collection system’s 
complexity. The spatial and temporal variation in hate crime laws, including protected categories 
and language, is ideally represented both quantitatively (the number of states, intervals of time, 
how many hate crimes were recorded against protected categories) as well as qualitatively 
(language). Some of this data may be too complex to effectively communicate with a map—for 
example, temporal variation in protected categories and crime rate is best visualized as a graph. 
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However, situating particular cases in their spatial context is helpful for invoking the lived 
realities behind the data. 
Following D’Ignazio and Klein’s emphasis on making labor visible, a geovisualization 
showing the flow of information required for the FBI’s data partly illustrates the complexities of 
the collection system. Interviewing federal and local law enforcement agency employees about 
their roles in data gathering and management is not within the scope of this project. However, the 
contours of individual labor are somewhat illuminated by mapping actual cases—through how 
victims connected with police, the system used to report cases (NIBRS or SRS), how they were 
recorded in the system, and whether they were reported but not prosecuted. The latter aspect 
reflects the effects and reach of labor exerted by initial reporting agencies and their communities. 
Mapping quantitative data alongside qualitative enhances understanding of how abstract 
legal categories are negotiated and enacted by the FBI’s hate crime reporting system. It 
illuminates the narratives already theorized by advocacy organizations, leveraging the value 











CHAPTER 4: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Data 
Statistical data used in this project was drawn from: 1) the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting program master files for hate crime, 1991–2017; 2) the 
1990, 2000, and 2010 US census; 3) the 2005 and 2017 American Community Surveys; 4) data 
available via the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA); 5) a data set of state hate crime 
legislation compiled with reference to Nexis Uni and the Arab American Foundation Institute’s 
2018 Underreported, Under Threat report; 6) 2015-2017 reports of bias incidents from the 
Council on American Islamic Relations; and 7) the years 2015-2017 from the Mapping 
Islamophobia data set. 
FBI Hate Crime Data 
The 1991–2016 FBI master files for hate crime were obtained via email request to FBI 
Crime Statistics. The 2017 master file was obtained by request from a journalist, after an 
unsuccessful request to FBI Crime Statistics (the reason cited for denial was technical 
difficulties). The 27 original .txt and .dat master files received were parsed into .csv format using 
an R script written by Matt Jansen, then Data Analyst at the UNC-CH Davis Library Research 
Hub. Two .csv files for each year resulted: the Batch Header (BH) file, with information on 
which agencies submit reports of zero and nonzero by quarter; and the Incident Report (IR) file, 
with information on all reported hate crimes. 
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Counts of hate crime for all states (excluding Hawaii1) 1991–2017 were calculated from 
the FBI’s Incident Reports for each year. Incident reports were first aggregated to the law 
enforcement agencies associated with them by Originating Agency Identifier (ORI). The state 
abbreviations in ORIs were then used to aggregate counts to the state level. Similarly, agency 
participation rates and corresponding population covered were calculated from the FBI’s Batch 
Header files, which include population associated with all agencies for each year. 
For county-level aggregation, the Law Enforcement Agency Identifiers Crosswalk 
(LEAIC), available via the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, was used. 
This codebook contains agency ORIs matched to 5-digit county FIPS codes. The IR files were 
aggregated to county and year, and BH files to the same scale. Information from BH files is used 
to show agency participation in the FBI’s program. 
Control Variables 
Control variables used for statistical analysis are: total population; total and percent 
African America, Asian, Indigenous, Hispanic, Arab, Jewish, and Muslim population; highest 
educational attainment; median household income; and unemployment rate. 
Total population was used to obtain hate crime rate per capita for each state 1991–2017. 
Total population for each state was derived from the 1990, 2000, and 2010 US Census, and the 
2017 American Community Survey. Each year of data was downloaded from Social Explorer. 
Linear interpolation was used to estimate total population for each state for the years between 
1991, 2000, 2010, and 2017. The same method was used to estimate African American, 
Asian/Asian American, Indigenous (Native American), and Hispanic population for each state, 
as well as the percent of population identifying with these categories. For Asian / Asian 
                                                        
1 No law enforcement agencies in Hawaii submit hate crime reports to the FBI. 
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American, an additional step was used: The 1990 US Census combined the categories of “Asian” 
and “Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander,” which were subsequently disaggregated in the 
2000 Census. To estimate population for only “Asian,” “Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander” 
data from 2000 and 2010 were extrapolated back to 1990. These extrapolations were then 
subtracted from 1991-2000 interpolated estimates for “Asian.” 
Total Arab population for each state was derived from the 1990 and 2000 US Census, and 
the 2005 and 2017 American Community Surveys (ACS). The estimate is conservative: Only the 
counts of respondents reporting a single, first ancestry of “Arab” were used. Linear interpolation 
was used to estimate Arab population for each state for the years between 1990, 2000, 2005, and 
2017. The 2010 census did not include a question regarding ancestry; the 2005 ACS was 
therefore used in interpolation instead. 
The same method was used to estimate median household income, highest educational 
attainment, and unemployment rate. Percentages for the latter two variables were calculated from 
total population over 25, and total civilian workforce population over 25, respectively. 
The data sets downloaded via ARDA are the 1990 Churches and Church Membership in 
the United States; the Religious Congregations and Membership Study, 2000 (State File); and the 
U.S. Religion Census: Religious Congregations and Membership Study, 2010 (State File). Linear 
interpolation was used to estimate Muslim and Jewish population by state for years 1991-2009. 
The populations available from the 2010 US Religion Census were used for years 2010-2017. 
Legislation 
My data set of state hate crime legislation covers two different methods of categorization, 
as mentioned in the Background chapter’s Penalty Enhancement section. The first corresponds to 
categories developed by criminologists Jenness and Grattet (2001), based on the extent to which 
 54 
hate crime laws changed existing criminal and civil code. From most to least change (or 
“embedded”ness) these categories are Civil rights, Freestanding, Modifying, Coattailing, and 
Penalty Enhancement. As these categories exist on a spectrum, and are mutually exclusive, they 
are considered together in this project’s multiple regression analysis. 
The second method of categorization is derived from activist organizations including the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Arab American 
Foundation Institute. Bell presents a similar categorization of hate crimes (2002, p. 16-17). This 
method differentiates between hate crime legislation in terms of its consequences. Categories 
include penalty enhancement, data collection, police training, civil action, institutional 
vandalism, and cross burning. The penalty enhancement category here refers to statutes 
providing for crime prosecution, and encompasses all of the Jenness and Grattet classes 
excepting civil action. This is due to the fact that clauses providing for prosecution could be 
added to existing statutes (Coattailing, Modifying or Penalty Enhancement), or constitute 
independent (Freestanding) statutes. As these categories do not constitute a spectrum, and are 
thus not mutually exclusive, interaction between them may affect the results of multiple 
regression analysis. They are thus considered singularly in this project’s statistical analysis. 
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Single Variable Analysis 
Counts of Hate Crime 
The FBI’s 1991–2017 master files 
record 192,464 reports of hate crime 
incidents. The incident reports’ longitudinal 
distribution is uneven, with the 4,589 
counts reported in 1991 increasing by 
nearly 50% to 6662 in 1992 (Figure 2). 
2001 saw the highest number of reports, at 
9,730. The second lowest number of 
reports—5,479—occurred in 2014, before a 
steady increase across the years 2015–2017. 
Normalized by population, rates 
across states vary markedly year by year 
(Figure 3). National trends are still 
reflected: 2001 shows an increase in rates 
across many states, while 2014 portrays a 
decrease. In states with the lowest hate 
crime rates, numbers tend to remain more 
constant than in states with higher rates. 
The state with highest increase in rate from 
Figure 2: US Hate Crime Counts by Year 
Figure 3: Reported Hate Crime Rates by State, 1991-2017 
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2016–17 is the District of Columbia, 
where 115 reports were recorded in 
2016, and 193 in 2017. 
A boxplot of state rates 
shows a rise, fall, and rise in mean 
rates over time, mirroring nationwide 
counts (Figure 4). The first five years 
(1991–1995) show greater variation 
than the following years. 
Divided by region2, states in 
the Northeast and West show higher 
average rates than the Midwest and 
South (Figure 5). In the South, there 
are several states with recorded hate 







                                                        
2 States are divided as follows: the Northeast includes CT, MA, ME, NY, NH, NJ, PA, RI, VT; the West includes 
AK, AZ, CA, CO, ID, MT, NM, NV, OR, UT, WA; the South includes AR, AL, DC, DE, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, 
MI, OK, NC, SC, TN, TX, WV, VA; and the Midwest includes IL, IN, IO, KS, MI, MO, MN, ND, NE, OH, SD, 
WI. 
Figure 4: Reported Hate Crime Rates by State, Boxplot 



















Figure 7: Reported Hate Crime Rates by State, South 

























Figure 8: Reported Hate Crime Rates by State, Midwest 
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Figure 9 shows the breakdown of counts by protected category covered in this thesis: 
African American, Arab, Asian/Asian American, Indigenous, Muslim, and Jewish. Out of these 
categories, reported counts of anti-African American hate crimes are highest, and anti-Arab are 
lowest. 
Most of the reported counts, except for anti-Muslim hate crimes, mirror the general trend 
of increase from 2016–2017. Reported counts for anti-Muslim and anti-Arab hate crimes spike in 
2001, while other categories (excepting anti-Hispanic and anti-Indigenous) show little change 
from 2000–2001. The line for anti-Arab hate crimes ends at 2003, and begins again in 2015, 
because the FBI did not accept hate crime reports coded as anti-Arab from 2004–2014. 
Figure 10 shows the same data, but in rates normalized by estimated populations of the 
groups. Like other figures in this section, these rates are multiplied by 1,000,000 to provide a 
more practical understanding of the number of people affected. For example, for every 1,000,000 
Muslims in the U.S., over 600 were the targets of reported hate crimes. This understanding of 
Figure 9: Counts of Reported Hate Crimes Against Protected Groups 
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rates may be slightly inaccurate, as one reported hate crime could have multiple victims. 
However, it is helpful for a basic understanding of the scope of reported hate crimes against 
particular groups. 
When normalized by populations, rates against these particular groups (Figure 10) show 
different scales in the same data displayed by count in Figure 9. Due to a smaller population than 
other groups, the 2001 spike in anti-Muslim and anti-Arab hate crime is much more pronounced. 
Reported rates of anti-Semitic hate crime overtake reported rates of anti-African American/anti-
Black hate crime in many years, especially following 1995. The recent upward trend in anti-
Indigenous (anti-American Indian and Alaskan Native) hate crimes is also much more 
pronounced. By contrast, anti-Hispanic and anti-Asian rates are less pronounced in comparison 
to the other group rates. 
 




The FBI master files’ Batch Header 
tables record information on all US local and 
state law enforcement agencies’ reporting for 
each quarter per year. If reporting, agencies 
are recorded as submitting zero or incident 
(nonzero) reports for each quarter. Figure 11 
shows the percentage of agencies reporting to 
the FBI 1991–2017, and the percentage of 
population covered across the US by 
reporting agencies. There was a large 
increase in reporting across the early years of 
the FBI program, with the percentage of US 
agencies submitting reports rising from less 
than 25% in 1991 to nearly 60% in 1996. 
1996–2017 reflect a leveling off of the prior 
increase, with the highest percentage overall in 
2017 at nearly 75%. A parallel trend holds true 
for the percentage of US population covered 
by reporting agencies, with the highest percentages covered in 2013, 2014, and 2017. Percentage 
of population covered is greater than percentage of reporting agencies, indicating that non-
reporting agencies, especially after 1996, tend to be smaller. 
Figure 11 Figure 12: Percenta e of Agencies Reporting 
Figure 11: Reporting from States with Mandates 
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For only states with data reporting laws, there is a steeper increase from 1991–96, likely 
driven by both more agencies reporting, and more states passing data collection laws. Figure 12 
illustrates a higher percentage of agencies reporting from 1996–2004, with numbers after 2004 
close to trends for all states, regardless of reporting mandate. Population covered is much higher 
than the overall rate in Figure 11 after 1996. 
Legislation 
Figures 13, 14, and 15 
illustrate how many states passed 
penalty enhancement, data 
collection/reporting, and police 
training laws from the years 1970–
2019. Penalty enhancement and data 
collection legislation passage is 
clustered around the year 1990, 
while police training legislation 
passage is more dispersed 





























Figure 14: States Passing Data Collection and Reporting Mandates 
Figure 15: States Passing Police Training Law 
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Bivariate Analysis 
Reported Hate Crime Rates and Legislation 
Figure 16 shows hate crime rates by 
state relative to the year penalty enhancement 
legislation was passed. Hate crime rates prior 
to legislation are shown to the left of the 
turquoise marker at x-axis 0. Hate crime rates 
post-legislation are shown to the right. There is 
no clear change between rates before versus 
after legislation is passed. Penalty enhancement 
laws do not necessarily translate to more or less 
data collection and reporting. 
Figure 17 shows hate crime rates by 
state relative to the year data collection 
legislation was passed. There are now more 
lines present to the left of the turquoise marker, 
as there are less states with data collection 
mandates. The median rate increases slightly 
over time. One example of a factor that could 
be inflating rates before data collection laws 
were passed is the Clery Act, which requires 
law enforcement agencies at universities 
Figure 16 
Figure 17 
Figure 16 Figure 16: Hate Crime Rates Relative to Year Penalty 
Enhancement Law Passed 
Figure 17: Hate Crime Rates Relative to Year Data 
Collection Law Passed 
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receiving federal funding to report hate crimes to the FBI. 
Figure 18 shows hate crime rates 
relative to the year police training legislation 
was passed. There are even more lines now 
present to the left of the turquoise marker, as 
only 15 states have police training mandates. 
The visualization mirrors the lack of pattern 
shown in the penalty enhancement graph, 
although the average rate increases slightly 
over time for both. 
While penalty enhancement legislation 
is necessary for hate crime prosecution, it 
does not guarantee reporting (ProPublica 
2017). Besides data collection mandates, 
what else does the FBI’s data indicate 
contributes to increased reporting? One 
factor could be the percentage of a state’s 
population that is covered by agencies 
participating in the FBI’s reporting program. 
Figure 19 illustrates the relationship 
between this percentage and hate crime 
rate. Figure 20 shows the same data 
condensed into states for all years 1996-2017. 
Figure 17 
Figure 19 
Figure 18 Figure 18: Hate Crime Rat s Relative to Year Police 
Training Law Passed 


















Figure 20: Population Covered by Reporting and Hate 
Crime Rate, 1996-2017 
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Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes: FBI, CAIR, and Mapping Islamophobia Data 
To examine potential gaps in the 
FBI data the data was filtered to only anti-
Muslim hate crimes and, two other data 
sets were analyzed. The first is the bias 
incident reports kept by CAIR, and second 
the Mapping Islamophobia data set 
compiled by a team at Grinnell College. 
CAIR reports extend from 2014–2017, 
and included bias-motivated incidents that 
could be considered hate crimes, as well 
as other bias incidents that were removed before analysis. The Mapping Islamophobia data 
covers 2008–2017, and draws from media-verified reports of bias-motivated incidents that could 
be considered hate crimes, as well as other incidents including political speeches and Qur’an 
burning, which were removed prior to analysis. The FBI data contains greater counts than both 
CAIR and Mapping Islamophobia. 
Figure 21 shows counts of anti-Muslim hate crime recorded by all three data sets. While 
the FBI’s counts are highest in all years, CAIR’s counts mirror the increases and decrease in the 
FBI’s data from 2015–2017. The Mapping Islamophobia data also generally increases from 
2014–2017. 
 
Figure 21 Figure 21: Reported Anti-Muslim Hate Crime Counts by Year 
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Figure 22 shows average FBI and CAIR 
rates for each state from years 2015–2017 plotted 
against each other. Years 2015–2017 were 
chosen for this analysis because the quantity of 
data for CAIR and Mapping Islamophobia 
increased dramatically from 2014–2015, 
indicating greater coverage—and perhaps more 
comprehensive data collection. Points above the 
orange line show states in which the reports 
collected by CAIR exceeded reports collected by the FBI. 
Figure 23 shows the same data as 
Figure 22, zoomed in to the area outlined in 
teal in both charts. Out of the 12 states that 
appear above the orange line, two of them 
(Georgia and Arkansas) lack penalty 
enhancement laws. Five (AR, AL, GA, MS, 
and WI) lack data collection laws. And nine 
lack police training laws—California, Iowa 
and Illinois are the exceptions. These 12 
states include AL, AR, CA, FL, GA, IA, IL, 
MD, MS, NE, OK, and WI. 




Figure 22: Reported Hat Crime Counts by Rate 





Figures 26 and 27 show the same for 
FBI and Mapping Islamophobia data. There are 
11 states above the orange line: AL, FL, GA, 
IA, MS, NE, OK, SC, VT, WV, and WI. Eight 
of these states overlap with the states above the 
orange line in Figure 25. Two of them (GA and 
SC) lack penalty enhancement laws. Seven 
(AL, GA, MS, SC, VT, WV, and WI) lack data 
collection laws. And all but one (IA) lack 
police training laws. 
Figures 28 and 29 display the same data as rates by Muslim population in each state. 
Figure 24 Figure 25 
Figure 26 
Figure 24: Reported Anti-Muslim Hate Crime Rates 
by State 
Figure 25: Reported Anti-Muslim Hate Crime Rates by 
State: Zoomed In 















Figure 27: Reported Anti-Muslim Hate Crime 
Rates by State 
Figure 28: Reported Hate Crime Counts by State: 
Zoomed In 
Figure 29: Reported Anti-Muslim Hate Crime Rates by 
State: Zoomed In 
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Multivariate Analysis: Statistical Regression 
Statistical regression was utilized to more comprehensively assess relationships between 
legislation, agency participation, and reported hate crime rates. While regression is a fallible 
estimate of such relationships, it provides an indicator of whether variables are related, to what 
degree, and if their relationships become evident when taking other controls into consideration. 
Due to the data’s dispersed nature, a negative binomial regression was chosen for 
analysis. In preparation for regression, the data was cleaned and organized as panel data in R. 
The glmer.nb function in the lme4 package was used to apply a negative binomial regression to 
the data. As negative binomial regression requires count—not rate—data, interpolated population 
was provided as an offset, effectively normalizing the counts. Both state and year were 
controlled for as random effects. 
Six relationships between reported hate crime rates, agency participation, and legislation 
were investigated. For all six, reported hate crime rates by state and year served as the dependent 
variable. Independent variables tested were: 1) penalty enhancement legislation, 2) data 
collection legislation, 3) data reporting legislation, 4) police training mandates, and 5) the 
typology of penalty enhancement laws defined by Jenness and Grattet (2001). For the Jenness 
and Grattet typology, each type was included — Penalty Enhancement, Coattailing, Modifying, 
Freestanding, and Civil Rights — plus variables accounting for statutes criminalizing hate and 
bias-motivated crimes, and perception clauses. These variables were determined using a 
codebook previously used for a similar statistical analysis (Stacey 2015). Control variables tested 
were 1) percent of the population above age 25 with bachelor’s degrees, 2) unemployment rate, 
and 3) median household income. 
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The relationships were first tested for total reported hate crime rate, with an offset of total 
population. They were then tested for reported hate crime rate for seven bias motivations, with 
offsets of estimated populations of corresponding groups. These seven bias motivations are 1) 
Anti-Black or African American, 2) Anti-Asian, 3) Anti-Arab, 4) Anti-Hispanic, 5) Anti-
American Indian/Alaskan Native, 6) Anti-Jewish, and 7) Anti-Islamic (Muslim). Five 
regressions per group were run: 1) no control variables, 2-4) with each control variable, and 5) 
with all control variables. Tables 1-6 show the regression outputs for overall population. 
Appendices A, B, C, D, E, and F show the regression outputs for the seven bias motivations. 
Dependent 
Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.00245 ** (0.18142)   
2.03e-10 *** 
(0.79682) 
Unemployment   6.57e-06 *** (-0.23951)  
1.18e-07 *** 
(-0.28847) 
Income    0.262 (0.04288) 
1.37e-08 *** 
(-0.58262) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated total population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.  
Table 1: Regression Output for Overall Population, Penalty Enhancement Law 
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Dependent 
Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.00269 ** (0.18075)   
2.07e-10 *** 
(0.79980) 
Unemployment   7.43e-06 *** (-0.23596)  
1.43e-07 *** 
(-0.28617) 
Income    0.230 (0.04483) 
9.28e-09 *** 
(-0.58698) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated total population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 










Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.000995 *** (0.19337)   
3.09e-10 *** 
(0.80355) 
Unemployment   6.45e-06 *** (-0.23704)  
2.30e-07 *** 
(-0.28239) 
Income    0.1167 (0.05983) 
2.56e-08 *** 
(-0.57812) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated total population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 










Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.00585 ** (0.08502)   
4.93e-09 *** 
(0.88709) 
Unemployment   1.03e-05 *** (-0.23255)  
1.22e-05 *** 
(-0.24430) 
Income    0.364 (0.03323) 
1.40e-12 *** 
(-0.84403) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated total population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 










Dependent Variable      
Reported Hate Crime 
Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables      



































































































Education  0.000378 *** (0.23320)   
3.67e-11 *** 
(0.80922) 
Unemployment   2.12e-06 *** (-0.25014)  
8.30e-08 *** 
(-0.28709) 
Income    0.10003 (0.06730) 
2.67e-08 *** 
(-0.56726) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: Groups 
(N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
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Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated total population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Table 5: Regression Output for Overall Population, Jenness and Grattet Typology 
 
Dependent 
Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 







< 2e-16 *** 
(1.84504) 
< 2e-16 *** 
(1.8816) 
< 2e-16 *** 
(1.83000) 
Education  0.0851 (0.3085)   
1.21e-09 *** 
(0.68595) 
Unemployment   7.65e-05 *** (-0.18950)  
1.09e-06 *** 
(-0.23727) 
Income    5.02e-06 *** (-0.1492) 
4.54e-13 *** 
(-0.66268) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated total population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 





The regressions showed few significant relationships between reported hate crime and 
legislation for the total population. Penalty enhancement, data collection, and police training 
laws were shown to have insignificant correlation to reported hate crime rates for the overall 
population. Overall, data reporting was shown to have a slightly significant (to the .05 level) 
negative correlation with reported hate crime rate. For the Jenness and Grattet typology with 
overall population, there was a slightly significant negative correlation between rate and hate 
crime statute existence, and a significant (to the .01 level) correlation between rate and 
coattailing statutes. 
For anti-Hispanic and anti-Black or African American hate crimes, there was little to no 
correlation between rate and penalty enhancement, data collection, and police training laws. 
Regression for both of these groups showed significant negative correlations between rate and 
data reporting mandates. 
Regression for anti-Semitic/Jewish and anti-Muslim hate crimes reflected no significant 
correlation between rate and penalty enhancement and police training laws. There were 
significant negative correlations between rate and data collection and reporting mandates. 
When all control variables were applied, Anti-Asian hate crime rate was shown to have a 
significant positive correlation with penalty enhancement, data collection, and police training 
laws. Without controls, it showed a slightly significant negative correlation with data reporting 
mandates, but changed to no correlation when controls were included. 
Anti-Arab American and Anti-American Indian/Alaskan Native hate crime rates were 
shown to have significant positive correlations with penalty enhancement and police training 
laws. They showed none or slight positive correlations with data collection and reporting laws. 
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For the Jenness and Grattet typology, laws classed as Coattailing had a positive 
correlation with hate crime rates overall, as well as with anti-African American, anti-Asian, anti-
Hispanic, anti- American Indian/Alaskan Native, anti-Jewish, and anti-Muslim hate crime rates. 
Freestanding laws had a slightly significant negative correlation with overall hate crime rates, 
and significant negative correlations with anti-African American, anti-Hispanic, and anti-
American Indian/Alaskan Native hate crime rates. 
The presence of a hate crime law had a slight positive correlation with hate crime rates 
overall, as well as with anti-African American and anti-Arab hate crime rates. Civil rights laws 
had positive correlations with anti-Asian and anti-Jewish hate crime rates. Penalty enhancement 
laws (as defined by Jenness and Grattet) had significant positive correlations with anti-Asian 
hate crime reporting rates, but significant negative correlations with anti-Arab and anti-American 
Indian/Alaskan Native hate crime rates. The presence of reporting mandates had a significant 
positive correlation with anti-Hispanic hate crime rates. 
Overall, there is not a clear pattern shown in correlations between reported hate crime 
rates, and the laws defined by the Jenness and Grattet typology, and variables added by Stacey 
(2015). While some of the laws in the typology seem to have more positive correlations, like 
Coattailing and Civil Rights, others like Freestanding seem to have more negative correlations. 
Five regressions per group (and overall) were also run to investigate the relationship 
between reported hate crime rates and population covered by reporting agencies: 1) no control 
variables, 2-4) with each control variable, and 5) with all control variables. For all regressions, 
there was a positive correlation significant at the .001 level between reported hate crime rates 
and population covered. This shows a correlation between agency participation in the FBI’s 
program, and reported hate crime rate—when taking into account population covered by the 
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former. This suggests a connection between low hate crime rates and agency non-participation, 
indicating that low rates may be due to missing data, and not lack of bias-motivated violence.  
For most of the regressions run, the control variables showed both negative and positive 
correlations to reported hate crime rates, at varying levels of significance. Percentage of 
population with a bachelor’s degree generally held a positive correlation to reported rates. On the 
other hand, unemployment rate and median income generally held a negative correlation to 
reported rates. This could indicate that bias-motivated violence is occurring less in areas that 
have lower percentages of the population with tertiary education degrees, lower median incomes, 
and higher unemployment rates. It could also indicate that bias-motivated violence is reported 
less in areas with these characteristics. This may be an area for more in-depth statistical and 
qualitative inquiry. 
Overall, the regressions show little to no correlation between reported hate crime rates 
and legislation. While this could be interpreted to mean that hate crime laws have no effect on 
hate crime documentation, the connection shown between agency participation and reported rates 
suggests otherwise. If agencies are reporting hate crimes more when they participate in the FBI’s 
program, a lack of reporting could indicate a lack of participation—and a lack of enforcement of 
data reporting and police training mandates, if existent. The temporal patterns shown by the 
univariate visualizations in this chapter indicate trends in reporting, with the starkest being the 
spike in agency participation between 1995–1996. If states with data reporting mandates (Figure 
12) had low participation rates in the early years of the FBI’s program—and still fail to have 
100% participation in the later years—there may certainly be a gap between the existence of data 
reporting mandates and their enforcement. The missing data that results from lack of 
participation certainly affects the reported hate crime rates, and may be symptomatic of larger 
 81 
gaps caused by lack of police training, lack of agency resources, and other sociopolitical factors 
at the local and regional scales. This possibility and its relationship to hate crime studies are 






















CHAPTER 5: GEOVISUALIZATION 
Geovisualizations of the FBI’s data and hate crime legislation were created at the county 
and state levels. State-level maps were created to illustrate legislation, while county-level maps 
show the FBI’s data. 
As mentioned in Theoretical Background, visualizing the data itself is a critical approach 
to understanding and communicating it. The FBI’s data is well-critiqued in hate crime literature 
(McDevitt & Iwama 2016, US Commission on Civil Rights 2019), yet rarely visualized. 
Visualizations that do exist are generally limited to line charts representing raw counts of data on 
a nationwide scale (Disha et al. 2011). Geovisualization itself allows for a spatialized 
understanding of the data. 
Maps of reported rates across the US exemplify “the God trick” that feminist geographer 
Donna Haraway critiques (1988), showing a bird’s-eye view of the nation, with standardized 
symbology and county boundaries neatly placed over the land — hardly an approach that 
represents the messy, everyday, and multiscale forms of violence that feminist political 
geographers engage (Cuomo 2013, Gökarıksel & Secor 2018). However, the flat, standardized 
surface is a step in the direction of visualizing the data in relation to the places where it 
originates. Maps show not only trends in the data, but allow viewers to associate particular rates 
with places and regions that have particular histories with violence. For example, Figure 29 
allows the viewer to clearly see that Mississippi and Georgia lack rates comparable to other 
states — a pattern not as clearly apparent in the region-specific line charts in the Statistical 
Analysis section. 
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However, geovisualizing the FBI data presents unique challenges. The data is collected at 
the agency level, and there is no shapefile available that allows for mapping all local agency 
jurisdictions in the US. Data must either be aggregated to the county or state level, using ORI 
codes, or geocoded as point data. The FBI’s hate crime data presents a modifiable areal unit 
problem (MAUP) in the fact that it cannot be easily aggregated to smaller units than counties. If 
the data were easily mapped to smaller units—for example, census tracts—the spatial patterns 
shown in the maps in this section may not hold true. The subsections in this chapter draw on 
county-level aggregation, visualizing the FBI’s data with the aim of illustrating gaps in the data. 
Reported Rates of Hate Crime 
A 2017 map created by ProPublica exemplifies the point data approach, with agencies not 
reporting in 2016 represented by black circle symbols of graduated size, illustrating the 
populations covered. Several arrows guide viewers through the map’s features (Schwencke 
2017). 
While the map is expertly created, it attempts to visualize lack through presence. The 
circle symbols seem the more effective choice for visualizing geocoded data, but they do not 
allow for comparison with agencies that do report — in other words, it is difficult to understand 
exactly how much reporting is being missed, in comparison to the overall number of local 
agencies and populations covered. 
To allow for comparison between places with varying reporting rates, a map with data 
aggregated to the county level was created for years 1991-2017. Müller and Schwartz present a 
similar map in an appendix to their paper on Twitter and hate crimes, but it lacks several 
cartographic features. In the case of Figure 30, a legend and title are added and projection 
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applied for cartographic purposes. Hawaii is absent because no local law enforcement agencies 
in Hawaii submit hate crime reports to the FBI. 
 
Figure 30: Average Reported Hate Crime Rate in US, 1991-2017 
Figure 30 shows clearly the counties in which no local agency has ever reported a hate 
crime. However, it is not only the use of polygon versus point data that influences perceptions of 
this particular visualization. When presented to audiences of academics and students, attention 
was drawn to areas indicating higher rates of hate crimes, such as New Jersey and parts of 
Michigan. It follows logically that without context on the FBI’s hate crime data, audiences 
trained in interpreting maps will nevertheless focus on areas that show a presence—rather than 
focusing on potential gaps in the data. The use of polygon data gives the possibility of showing 
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blank space in units (counties) comparable to others with data (Kirk 2015, Yau 2018). However, 
the authority carried by the FBI’s hate crime data—and gravity of the subject matter—
counterbalances the blank space, drawing the eye to areas that seem problematic. 
To counteract this effect, an inverse of Figure 30 was created (Figure 31). Instead of 
graduated symbology for all rates, the only counties filled in are those lacking data. 
 
Figure 31: Counties Where No Local Law Enforcement Agency Has Ever Reported a Hate Crime 
Like the ProPublica map, the use of color to indicate lack could be perceived instead as 
showing a presence of data. However, the map title specifically names the message, and guides 
the viewer through interpreting why counties are colored in navy blue. This geovisualization 
allows the viewer to focus on one aspect of the data alone—the gaps in it. The spatial 
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agglomeration of color draws the eye to the states of Georgia and Alabama in particular, and 
evokes the questions, “Why here?” “Why this spatial pattern?” Inspired by ProPublica’s map, the 
arrows introduce a narrative component. They help the viewer explore the map, and ground the 
visualization in the names of places where the illustrated process is actually occurring. 
Rates of Local Agency Participation 
Maps showing rates of local agency participation, and the population covered, reveal 
more about spatiotemporal patterns in the data. Mapping the average participation rates of local 
law enforcement agencies, as in Figure 32, shows clusters that nearly mirror state lines in some 
cases. Breaks in the symbology were based on the Jenks natural breaks classification method, 
and adjusted manually to correspond to multiples of 10. Average participation rates were 
calculated from the average number of years out of 1991–2017 that agencies in each county 
submitted reports—either zero or nonzero—to the FBI. Counties with the lowest average 
participation rates are clustered in the states of Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, 
Alaska, and New Mexico. There are a few counties in Mississippi and Alaska, and one in 
Louisiana, that show zero agency participation for all years. North Carolina, New York, West 
Virginia, Kentucky, Oregon, and New Hampshire show nearly all counties with average agency 
participation rates between 1-30%. California, South Carolina, Wisconsin, Arkansas, Tennessee, 
Arizona, and Virginia show nearly all counties with average agency participation rates between 
31-60%. Iowa and Texas show the highest spatially clustered average participation rates, with 
most counties between 91-100%. The rest of the states show varied average participation rates 
among counties. This variation may be affected by the breaks in the symbology, and could be 




Figure 32: Average Participation Rate of Local Law Enforcement Agencies 
Figure 33 shows the average percentage of population covered by local law enforcement 
agencies participating in the FBI’s reporting program. Spatial trends similar to those in the 
previous geovisualization hold true. However, like the line chart in the Statistical Analysis 
chapter, the map shows a higher percentage of population covered than agencies reporting. This 
comparison suggests that agencies covering larger populations are reporting more frequently, 
which corresponds to the mainly urban agencies that were the first to participate in the UCR 
program in the early 1990s. 
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Figure 33: Average Population Covered by Participating Local Law Enforcement Agencies 
Figure 34 shows the average years local law enforcement agencies in each county did not 
participate in the reporting program. Such a geovisualization inverts the premise of the previous 
two maps, illustrating lack instead of presence. While it utilizes a different color scheme, viewers 
transitioning from the previous two maps may still have difficulty adjusting to the concept of 
darker color equaling lack instead of presence. 
Again, breaks in the symbology were determined by Jenks natural breaks, and adjusted to 
correspond to multiples of 5. However, like the previous two maps, the breaks could be 
obscuring spatial patterns in the data. Different scales might be tested to explore the possibility to 
different spatial patterns. With different scales, states showing consistent variation in average 
years across counties present interesting paths for further qualitative inquiry. Another alternative 
would be to map the deviation from median measure for each state—although this would be a 
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relative measure to explore variation within states, and would not illustrate how each county 
relates to rates across the rest of the US. 
 
Figure 34: Average Years Local Law Enforcement Agencies Have Missed Reporting to the FBI 
Figure 35 again visualizes lack, showing the percentage of local agencies that missed at 
least one year of reporting. The map shows that most agencies in most counties across the US. 
have missed at least one year of reporting. The visualization in Statistical Analysis showing rates 
of reporting indicates the likelihood of most of these years being between 1991-1995, as 
participation rates increased exponentially between 1995-1996. 
According to this theory, the map shows that states including Washington, Idaho, Iowa, 
Tennessee, Texas, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New York had agencies that began participating 
earlier than their counterparts in other states. The consistent participation rates of agencies in 
Iowa—shown across most of the geovisualizations in this section—are intriguing, especially 
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because they do not match up to consistently high hate crime rates. This may be an area for 
further qualitative inquiry. 
 
Figure 35: Percentage of Law Enforcement Agencies That Have Missed at Least 1 Year of Hate Crime Reporting to 
the FBI 
The above geovisualizations of hate crime data show patterns of spatial autocorrelation in 
both reported hate crime rates, and rates of local agency reporting to the FBI. These patterns in 
many cases are interestingly consistent within states, suggesting that state-wide policy and laws 
may be partly responsible for the patterns. This is particularly intriguing when juxtaposed with 




Figures 36, 37, and 38 were 
created to show the presence of penalty 
enhancement, police training, and data 
collection legislation across states. The 
binary nature of data presented by the 
maps allows lack to be much more easily 
visualized and communicated. For the 
states lacking legislation, setting their 
symbology to match that of the map’s 












Figure 36: Penalty Enhancement Legislation for Hate Crimes 











Introducing Specific Cases 
Geovisualizations of the data alone may be able to communicate some of the gaps in the 
data. However, introducing narrative data alongside geovisualizations communicates what the 
data cannot: specific cases that are left out, the individuals and legal systems involved in 
compiling the data, and the data’s relationship to legal procedures governing hate crime 
prosecution. The following three figures explore potential methods of incorporating narrative 
data in proximity to geovisualizations of the FBI’s hate crime data. 
Figure 39 compares two 2015 hate crime cases: the Chapel Hill-based Our Three 
Winners case described in the Introduction, and the well-publicized Charleston church shooting. 
The brief text below the title contextualizes the geovisualization, both leading to the details to the 
right of the map, as well as alluding to the fact that there is missing data. Placing the data source, 
text on map content, and legend below the map helps draw attention to the individual cases, 
potentially making the map less a source of authoritative data, and more a contextualizing 
element to the narrative of missing data. 
Figure 38: Police Training Legislation for Hate Crimes 
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The text to the right of the map introduces the two individual cases in chronological 
order. Details about the victims are given first, adding a human element to the abstract colors and 
borders illustrated on the map—a reminder that the colors are an abstraction of violence, of on-
the-ground spatial realities affecting real communities. Two lines connect the text to the map, the 
circles around the small areas pertaining to the text emphasizing the map’s contextualizing role. 
Larger images of the counties involved help bridge the abstract symbology of the map with the 
details presented by the text. The cities in which the violence occurred are located within the 
counties, alluding to their context as real places, rich in memories and visceral experiences of the 
violence’s effects—as well as their contributions (or lack thereof) to the colors on the map. This 
shift in scale contextualizes the map’s abstraction, and the data with it. 
With the data contextualized in place, it potentially becomes easier for the viewer to 
understand the locally rooted realities of the prosecution and reporting outcomes of the case. 
Listing the details in the same format for both cases allows comparison, as well as notice that 
while the Charleston shooting exists within the map’s colors, the Our Three Winners case is 
absent. The infographic shows the erasure of data is connected to real communities, and 
embedded within complex and locally developed legal systems. 
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Figure 39: 2015 Hate Crime Reports: 2 Cases 
 
Figures 40 and 41 focus on individual cases missing from the data, in 2016 and 2017, 
respectively. In 2016, Lebanese American Khalid Jabara was shot dead on his front porch by his 
neighbor, after the latter hit Jabara’s mother with a car in their driveway. In 2017, Indian national 
Srinivas Kuchibhotla was shot dead in a Kansas bar by a man who had earlier harassed him, 
calling him a terrorist. According to the FBI’s master files, neither case was reported to the FBI 
as a hate crime. 
A similar format to Figure 39’s is used to illuminate the individual hate crime cases in 
Figures 40 and 41. A circle around the county on the map where the hate crime occurred is 
connected to the story, and a larger representation of the county. In this case, because missing 
data is explicitly examined, cities in the county are symbolized to show where hate crimes were 
reported. This also has the effect of adding a sense of place to an otherwise abstract shape—a 
 95 
sense that missing data, that the systems and categories used to report the data that does exist, are 
entwined with real communities.  
The narrative data presented to the map’s right might encourage viewers to look at the 
rest of the map in a different light, wondering if the blank spaces on the map would be filled with 
color with more reporting/different treatment of hate crime cases by local law enforcement 
agencies.  
 
Figure 40: 2016 Hate Crime Reports 
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Figure 41: 2017 Hate Crime Reports 
 
Lack of more context for the individual cases may complicate the viewer’s understanding 
of the infographics’ message. For example, without the context on the Our Three Winners case 
presented in the Introduction of this thesis, Figure 38 may not seem to be presenting a hate crime 
case. This presents a tension between including enough text to provide appropriate context, while 
limiting text to provide blank space to balance and organize the infographic’s design. Despite the 
design challenges presented when qualitative data is introduced, these infographics demonstrate 
that visualizing lack is made easier with the use of narrative details assisting abstract 
geovisualizations. 
StoryMap 
ArcGIS StoryMaps are digital tools that allow users to create scrollable narratives, and 
embed images and interactive maps. The concept of StoryMaps was first developed in 2010, by a 
former employee of National Geographic with expertise in print maps. As of spring 2019, over 
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1,000 StoryMaps per day were being generated by ESRI users, with 800,000 created since 2011 
(ArcGIS StoryMaps 2019). StoryMaps are used for a variety of purposes, including education, 
activism, and policy briefs (Szukalski and Carroll 2019). An increasing number of UNC-CH 
faculty are using StoryMaps in the classroom, having their students create narratives to explore 
research topics within disciplines including history and geography (UNC Libraries 2019). 
The balance of narrative and interactive aspects of StoryMaps allows for in-depth 
exploration of data, and pairing of quantitative and qualitative data. Their use in policy and 
education lies in allowing users to explore spatially rooted information—otherwise hidden 
patterns that maps of geospatial data reveal (Leadbeater 2019). Digital mapping makes the 
information both affordable to publish, as well as to update (Carroll 2018b). The low cost of 
republishing StoryMaps makes the tools ideal for incorporating community feedback, tweaking 
the narratives to better help viewers connect the ideas presented. 
The founder of the StoryMaps team observes a natural connection between narrative text 
and images, and maps. He asserts, like other narratives, geovisualizations are “simplifications, 
distillations, and interpretations of a hugely complex world. Maps provide meaning and context; 
they reveal patterns and relationships” (Carroll 2018a). 
There are, however, implications that come with using proprietary software to build 
digital narratives. In 2019, Esri released its new StoryMaps builder, a simplified version that 
collapsed features of its older templates into one interface (Evans 2019). The interface is more 
standardized, allowing less variety in text and layout, reminiscent of the minimalist design of 
Medium Corporation’s blog posts. Some of the same narrative-constructing layouts were 
immediately available upon the transition, while other features will only be added later to the 
new builder. 
 98 
StoryMaps is part of ArcGIS Online, a paid service available to UNC-CH affiliates 
through UNC Libraries. Uneven access to Esri’s proprietary software has the potential to 
perpetuate existing inequitable relationships between researchers and community members. 
StoryMaps are owned by one creator, and it is their choice whether to make any changes 
suggested by to improve design and narrative flows. However, StoryMaps are also easier to build 
and edit than other methods of creating digital narratives, including backend web design and 
frontend development, which require coding skills and more advanced technical knowledge. 
StoryMaps thus has the potential to disrupt hierarchies of skill, class, and access to resources that 
govern who is allowed and able to create and edit digital narratives. 
In creating my own digital narrative, I first began populating a web.unc.edu platform 
before switching to a StoryMap. Web.unc.edu sites are WordPress-based platforms housed on 
UNC-CH’s servers, and accessible to all UNC-CH affiliates. The design advantages presented by 
StoryMaps provoked the shift. First, StoryMaps allow the designer to completely control the 
narrative presented—in other words, they do not require user experience research to understand 
how users will navigate the site, and make connections between content on different web pages. 
Especially due to the complex nature of the legal and data collection systems inherent to the 
topic of US-based hate crimes, a StoryMap’s narrative better illuminates connections between 
these systems and their operations on different geographic scales. The website was written as a 
narrative, making it easy to transition content to the StoryMap. 
Second, StoryMaps allow for a concise bundle of content—an “About” page is replaced 
by a paragraph at the end with acknowledgements, and design choices regarding elements like 
the website header and footer are rendered irrelevant. 
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Third, the web.unc.edu Wordpress template provides limited choices for layout, including 
no option for creating columns. Introducing narrative data and visualizations together requires 
presenting them side-by-side, a format with several options available in StoryMaps. While other 
design choices like font and heading text space are limited, the clean format of those choices 
available helps create a cohesive visual narrative. 
StoryMap’s sidecar feature assists in creating a narrative that moves through maps at 
different scales—especially helpful for exploring individual hate crime cases. The slideshow 
feature, similar to the older Cascade template, is another feature that helps narrate interactive 
maps. However, slideshow currently only moves left to right, a limitation inhibiting the logical 
top-to-bottom flow of StoryMaps. StoryMaps leans away from full interactivity, instead 
providing zoom and pan features that allow the user to engage more with maps if they wish, but 
controlling the map extent and symbology automatically shown with each block of text (Carroll 
2018c). 
Using StoryMaps instead of a website-like platform lends itself to including more images 
than would likely be included on a website. The narrower space provided for text makes large 
blocks of text very obvious. However, information on the legal and data collection systems is 
crucial for contextualizing individual cases where StoryMaps’ interactive map embed feature is 
most helpful. Like with the infographics, design choices are needed to strike a balance between 
contextual information and the images and maps that engage the average viewer, causing them to 





CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
This project focuses on potential gaps in the FBI’s hate crime data. Using legal research 
combined with geovisualization and statistical analysis, it shows spatial and temporal patterns in 
the data. Drawing on critical race theory, this project approaches the data as constructed by a 
legal system that originated in violence—violence against minority and marginalized groups that 
hate crime laws are meant to protect. This project takes seriously the need for quantitative data to 
continue addressing bias-motivated violence in the US: without this data, it is difficult to show 
the extent to which this violence permeates US society. It raises the critical question of how 
accurate data will be compiled from local law enforcement agencies with origins in policing 
enslaved populations. 
Yet this project also raises the practical question of how gaps in the data can be 
visualized to help communicate how the data collection system works, and its connection to hate 
crime legislation. Issues rooted in a fundamentally inequitable legal system cannot be addressed 
until the constituents of those in power understand the nature of its corruption. This project 
attempts to help constituents understand how the system works, and fails to work. 
The project’s main questions address patterns in the data, and how to communicate these 
patterns. The project’s inquiry is interdisciplinary in nature: it brings together sociology and 
criminology literature with critical race theory and geography, as well as feminist GIS and 
critical approaches to visualizing data. 
The first question asks, “Are there patterns or relationships that can be shown by 
mapping the FBI’s hate crime data?” The maps produced explore ways to visualize 
 101 
spatiotemporal data—and result in illustrations of the data’s clustering within regions and 
states. Spatial autocorrelation across time is shown both in hate crime rates, as well as agency 
participation, and the populations covered. The maps corroborate criminology and sociology 
studies of hate crime data, and the spatial clustering over time rooted in local and regional 
advocacy efforts (McVeigh et al. 2003). Geographers’ use of critical race theory informs these 
studies, showing the spatial unevenness that corresponds to social inequities in the application of 
legal practices. 
The second question asks, “If patterns in the data exist, are they connected to hate crime 
legislation?” Statistical analysis is applied to answer this question. Visualizations of univariate 
and bivariate aspects of the data show temporal clustering in both legislation passed, and hate 
crime data. However, bivariate and multivariate analysis shows little consistent correlation 
between legislation and hate crime reporting from 1991–2017, even across different protected 
groups. This contradicts the hypothesis with which the data was approached—that patterns in the 
data are connected to hate crime legislation. It was assumed that at some level, legislation would 
have a positive impact on the reported hate crime rate. This was especially hypothesized for data 
collection and reporting laws, which in theory have a direct impact on the quantity and quality of 
data gathered by local law enforcement agencies. 
The negative finding also runs counter to the conclusion of a similar criminology study, 
which showed a correlation between hate crime legislation and reported anti-Hispanic hate 
crimes for 2000–2007 (Stacey 2015). This study compared the results to a lack of correlation 
between hate crime legislation and reported anti-African American/anti-Black hate crimes, 
hypothesizing in part that the discrepancy existed because of different groups’ experiences with 
local law enforcement groups and court systems. 
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However, the theory and descriptions of hate crime data collection in hate crime studies 
provide an explanation for this study’s negative finding. Rather than contradicting the idea that 
gaps exist in the FBI’s data, these studies show that other reasons could compound to prevent 
hate crime legislation from being correlated with a rise in reported hate crime rates. Critical race 
theory approaches, such Bell’s (2002) ethnographic study of police agency handling of hate 
crime, indicate that hate crime legislation is only the first step in compiling accurate data on hate 
crimes. 
Penalty enhancement laws may give a certain definition of hate crimes that local law 
enforcement agencies then use instead of the federal definition, thus impacting the categories 
represented in hate crime data. These laws may also reflect increased policymaker and civil 
employee attention to hate crime prosecution, which could have a correlated effect on attention 
to hate crime data. However, the penalty enhancement laws directly address only prosecution by 
courts, and not the separate process of data collection by local law enforcement agencies. 
Qualitative research with law enforcement agencies would be necessary for investigating the 
potential indirect effects of state penalty enhancement laws on data collection.  
The negative finding may also be a result of lack of hate crime legislation enforcement. 
The analysis shows data reporting mandates have not been 100% enforced (Figure 11). Without 
enforcement, states with such mandates could still be missing hate crime data. Such states could 
also be missing data due to lack of police training in data collection, as well as other barriers 
including shortage of resources to collect and report statistics (McDevitt & Iwama 2016). Police 
training laws mean little if the training is applied without consideration of local political context, 
if police-community relationships are low-trust or nonexistent, or if police agencies lack 
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resources to maintain statistics (Bell 2002, McDevitt & Iwama 2016, US Commission on Civil 
Rights 2019). 
The statistical analysis’ one positive finding—the correlation between agency 
participation rates and reported hate crime rates—corroborates these hypotheses. The correlation 
suggests that when agencies have the resources and leadership direction necessary to report hate 
crime data consistently to the FBI, their reported hate crime rates go up. It also suggests that low 
hate crime rates in a certain area could be symptomatic of lack of agency participation, instead of 
lack of bias-motivated violence. The spatiotemporal trends shown by geovisualization and 
statistical analysis indicates clustering in the data, which could be a result of local and regional 
sociopolitical factors—including agency leadership, and training and data reporting resources 
allotted. 
Bell’s (2002) ethnographic study with a local police agency provides valuable insight into 
the complexity of the systems that produce hate crime data and prosecution. While there have 
since been studies of individual experiences of hate crime (Richardson et al. 2016), the questions 
raised by this study’s negative finding would benefit from qualitative research akin to Bell’s. 
Interviews, focus groups and other qualitative methods may elicit explanations for why agencies 
did or did not report in particular years, including the role of hate crime legislation in their 
actions.  
The third question asks, “How can these relationships be visualized to communicate the 
complexities of legislation, and the reporting system?” This question shifts to an approach that 
blends theory with practical design principles. It examines how the complexities of the FBI’s 
hate crime data collection system can be visualized, showing missing data and its links to a 
system that was not founded to enforce equal treatment for all. The visualizations and 
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geovisualizations created, as well as the case-specific infographics and the StoryMap, visualize 
the gaps in the data through exploring spatial and temporal patterns, as well as introducing 
narrative information. These visualizations draw on principles and theoretical frameworks from 
feminist GIS, as well as critical, activist, and decolonizing approaches to data and data 
visualization. 
Future Directions 
This project’s interdisciplinary nature opens several paths of future investigation. One is 
to further expand on its storytelling and visualization tools. One could create refined StoryMaps 
and other digital humanities projects that explore more hate crime cases, and allow users greater 
interactivity with the information presented. Qualitative research could include focus groups and 
interviews with viewers of the information, as well as asking viewers to create their own 
visualizations (high-tech or on a sheet of paper) to analyze how they process the information 
presented and relate it to themselves and their communities. 
Another future path of investigation could include use of spatial statistics to further 
explore spatial autocorrelation in the FBI’s data. A k-means analysis could be applied to the 
average hate crime rate per year/county to explore spatiotemporal clustering in the data—for 
example, if certain clusters of counties experience the same rates of reporting over time, and 
whether these rates increase, decrease, start out high or low, or stay the same. Differences in 
average hate crime rate per year/county could also be calculated from state or regional global 
means, to show which counties in regions may be outliers, and worthy of more qualitative 
investigation to understand the underlying processes producing such patterns. Rank Mobility 
Index analysis could be also used to understand which counties across the US, and across 
particular states and regions, report consistently low or high rates of hate crime. 
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A third further path of investigation is collaborative work with communities affected by 
hate crimes, as well as with local advocacy groups, police departments, and national advocacy 
groups. Visualizations—including infographics and the StoryMap—could be presented to local 
advocacy groups, and focus groups held to understand better how visually communicating this 
data—and gaps in it—could be completed to address community needs. Similar outreach could 
be done with national advocacy groups. 
A fourth further path of study—raised in the previous subsection—is qualitative research 
with police agencies. Interviews, focus groups, and in-depth ethnographic studies of police 
agencies illuminate the complex factors influencing agencies’ reporting patterns (Bell 2002). 
Such research could be applied in areas with consistently high reported rates, such as New Jersey 
and Michigan, and consistently low reported rates, such as Mississippi and Georgia. A k-means 
clustering analysis would identify counties that had significant fluctuations in reported rates, 
such as the District of Columbia, which would also merit qualitative inquiry. 
Overall, this project attempts to translate to geography what critical race theory scholars 
have attained via their litigation practice—critique of the fundamental inequities of legal and 
social systems, raised through engagement rooted in the reality of specific cases. In doing so, it 
joins the data justice and counter-mapping projects that challenge conventional, and historically 
privileged, cartographic representations of social realities. Contrary to research and journalism 
claiming a rise in bias-motivated violence in the U.S., this project views hate crime data as a rare 
and incomplete glimpse of violence that marginalized groups in the US have faced since the 
country’s founding. Through in-depth analysis of the FBI’s data, and visualization of this data, 
this project shows gaps that must be both understood and addressed, to better comprehend the 
scope of ongoing violence against marginalized groups in the US.  
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APPENDIX 1: REPORTED HATE CRIME RATE AND PENALTY ENHANCEMENT 
LEGISLATION 
Dependent 
Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 














Education  0.807 (-0.02010)   
4.71e-09 *** 
(0.88900) 
Unemployment   0.00238 ** (-0.17225)  
1.29e-05 *** 
(-0.24424) 
Income    0.000665 *** (-0.1573942) 
2.77e-12 *** 
(-0.83667) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated African American population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 









Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 














Education  <2e-16 *** (-0.92311)   
0.000844 *** 
(0.55309) 
Unemployment   0.200 (-0.09342)  
0.011631 * 
(-0.16571) 
Income    <2e-16 *** (-0.72375) 
< 2e-16 *** 
(-1.13313) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Asian/Asian American population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 










Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 














Education  0.0288 * (0.8294)   
0.00594 ** 
(2.0194) 
Unemployment   0.532 (-0.1500)  
0.05608 
(-0.6135) 
Income    0.6278 (-0.3595) 
0.04384 * 
(-3.5356) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Arab/Arab American population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 










Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 














Education  0.00169 ** (-0.26284)   
0.044 * 
(0.32348) 
Unemployment   0.753 (-0.02141)  
0.371 
(-0.06139) 
Income    3.22e-08 *** (-0.28647) 
3.95e-05 *** 
(-0.52564) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Hispanic population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 










Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 














Education  0.02254 * (2.1988)   
0.984726 
(-0.005519) 
Unemployment   7.39e-05 *** (-0.4046)  
0.000953 *** 
(-0.355336) 
Income    0.00663 ** (0.21096) 
0.556256 
(0.124231) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated American Indian and Alaskan Native 
population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 











Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 














Education  0.307 (0.06302)   
0.000180 *** 
(0.56734) 
Unemployment   0.0516 (-0.10833)  
0.013051 * 
(-0.14186) 
Income    0.622 (-0.02271) 
0.000113 *** 
(-0.45976) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Jewish population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 










Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 














Education  0.0742 (0.32485)   
0.605205 
(0.11340) 
Unemployment   7.82e-05 *** (-0.31911)  
0.000594 *** 
(-0.28953) 
Income    0.00983 ** (0.38684) 
0.370272 
(0.18071) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Muslim population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 










APPENDIX 2: REPORTED HATE CRIME RATE AND DATA COLLECTION 
LEGISLATION 
Dependent 
Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.9519 (0.005102)   
4.83e-09 *** 
(0.88761) 
Unemployment   0.00366 ** (-0.16407)  
1.82e-05 *** 
(-0.23977) 
Income    0.00227 ** (-0.14337) 
5.78e-12 *** 
(-0.82602) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated African American population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 









Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  <2e-16 *** (-0.91866)   
0.000583 *** 
(0.56369) 
Unemployment   0.140 (-0.10818)  
0.002724 ** 
(-0.19839) 
Income    <2e-16 *** (-0.71273) 
< 2e-16 *** 
(-1.14269) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Asian/Asian American population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 











Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.0983 (0.6480)   
0.000511 *** 
(2.1352) 
Unemployment   0.275 (-0.2601)  
0.005870 ** 
(-0.7784) 
Income    0.369 (-0.7799) 
2.18e-05 *** 
(-4.0068) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Arab/Arab American population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 











Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.00584 ** (-0.23083)   
0.0388 * 
(0.33298) 
Unemployment   0.842 (-0.01361)  
0.3638 
(-0.06266) 
Income    5.36e-07 *** (-0.26030) 
7.82e-05 *** 
(-0.50858) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Hispanic population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 











Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.0055 ** (0.3127)   
0.977023 
(0.00835) 
Unemployment   2.71e-05 *** (-0.4358)  
0.000631 *** 
(-0.37232) 
Income    0.000945 *** (0.25653) 
0.480753 
(0.14994) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated American Indian and Alaskan Native 
population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 










Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.1811 (0.08336)   
0.000168 *** 
(0.57014) 
Unemployment   0.0643 (-0.10202)  
0.020183 * 
(-0.13314) 
Income    0.884 (-0.006716) 
0.000177 *** 
(-0.44642) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Jewish population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 











Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.0358 * (0.3912)   
0.517308 
(0.14396) 
Unemployment   8.53e-05 *** (-0.3163)  
0.000935 *** 
(-0.27859) 
Income    0.00304 ** (0.4443) 
0.268335 
(0.22324) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Muslim population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 










APPENDIX 3: REPORTED HATE CRIME RATE AND DATA REPORTING 
LEGISLATION 
Dependent 
Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.872374 (0.01330)   
6.63e-09 *** 
(0.8791) 
Unemployment   0.00665 ** (-0.15299)  
2.11e-05 *** 
(-18.6376) 
Income    0.00494 ** (-0.1327) 
1.55e-11 *** 
(-0.8082) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated African American population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 









Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  <2e-16 *** (-0.82372)   
0.000582 *** 
(0.57105) 
Unemployment   0.3388 (-0.07168)  
0.012790 * 
(-13.34962) 
Income    <2e-16 *** (-0.66789) 
< 2e-16 *** 
(-1.09921) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Asian/Asian American population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 











Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.08202 (0.6841)   
0.000265 *** 
(2.1970) 
Unemployment   0.309 (-0.2408)  
0.003513 ** 
(-62.4134) 
Income    0.3714 (-0.7498) 
4.11e-05 *** 
(-3.9970) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is total Arab/Arab American population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 











Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.00502 ** (-0.22991)   
0.04331 * 
(0.3261) 
Unemployment   0.885 (-0.009882)  
0.39291 
(-4.7557) 
Income    6.15e-07 *** (-0.25610) 
0.00011 *** 
(-0.5000) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Hispanic population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 











Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.00306 ** (0.3308)   
0.93525 
(0.02348) 
Unemployment   3.72e-05 *** (-0.4286)  
0.00074 *** 
(-29.48165) 
Income    0.000492 *** (0.26932) 
0.45462 
(0.15871) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated American Indian and Alaskan Native 
population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 










Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.16028 (0.08707)   
0.000236 *** 
(0.5602) 
Unemployment   0.0989 (-0.09143)  
0.036139 * 
(-9.8329) 
Income    0.98686 (-0.0007587) 
0.000311 *** 
(-0.4320) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Jewish population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 











Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.026 * (0.4222)   
0.568517 
(0.1295) 
Unemployment   0.000278 *** (-0.29302)  
0.003513 ** 
(-20.0029) 
Income    0.00119 ** (0.4807) 
0.158629 
(0.2843) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Muslim population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 










APPENDIX 4: REPORTED HATE CRIME RATE AND POLICE TRAINING 
LEGISLATION 
Dependent 
Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.71 (-0.03089)   
4.93e-09 *** 
(0.88709) 
Unemployment   0.0028 ** (-0.169393)  
1.22e-05 *** 
(-0.24430) 
Income    0.000303 *** (-0.16367) 
1.40e-12 *** 
(-0.84403) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated African American population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 









Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  <2e-16 *** (-0.90745)   
0.000789 *** 
(0.54942) 
Unemployment   0.167 (-0.10091)  
0.006067 ** 
(-0.18044) 
Income    <2e-16 *** (-0.70604) 
< 2e-16 *** 
(-1.11889) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Asian/Asian American population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 











Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.07829 (0.6832)   
0.000172 *** 
(2.2262) 
Unemployment   <2e-16 *** (-0.286725)  
0.002038 ** 
(-0.8563) 
Income    0.1332 (-2.0587) 
1.12e-08 *** 
(-4.4351) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Arab/Arab American population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 











Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.00329 ** (-0.24336)   
0.0396 * 
(0.33121) 
Unemployment   0.769 (-0.02005)  
0.3374 
(-0.06597) 
Income    1.8e-07 *** (-0.26794) 
6.07e-05 *** 
(-0.51503) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; estimated Hispanic population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 











Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.01297 * (0.2748)   
0.934693 
(-0.02417) 
Unemployment   2.41e-05 *** (-0.4314)  
0.000477 *** 
(-0.37654) 
Income    0.00285 ** (0.22730) 
0.504435 
(0.14293) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated American Indian and Alaskan Native 
population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 










Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.472 (0.04366)   
0.000185 *** 
(0.56300) 
Unemployment   0.0539 (-0.1068)  
0.009922 ** 
(-0.14725) 
Income    0.419 (-0.03629) 
5.92e-05 *** 
(-0.47430) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Jewish population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 











Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.0667 (0.33852)   
0.59981 
(0.11561) 
Unemployment   7.15e-05 *** (-0.32059)  
0.00064 *** 
(-0.28866) 
Income    0.00827 ** (0.39701) 
0.36593 
(0.18262) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Muslim population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 










APPENDIX 5: REPORTED HATE CRIME RATE AND JENNESS-GRATTET 
TYPOLOGY 
Dependent Variable      
Reported Hate Crime 
Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables      



































































































Education  0.45611 (0.06894)   
2.82e-09 *** 
(0.897824) 
Unemployment   0.00126 ** (-0.18109)  
1.34e-05 *** 
(-0.241930) 
Income    0.01566 * (-0.12132) 
2.37e-11 *** 
(-0.808840) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: Groups 
(N) 
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States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated African American population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Table 35: Regression Output for Estimated African American Population, Jenness and Grattet Typology 
 
Dependent Variable      
Reported Hate Crime 
Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables      



































































































Education  < 2e-16 *** (-0.94484)   
0.000616 *** 
(0.59268) 




Income    < 2e-16 *** (-0.74345) 
< 2e-16 *** 
(-1.18521) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: Groups 
(N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Asian/Asian American population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Table 36: Regression Output for Estimated Asian/Asian American Population, Jenness and Grattet Typology 
 
Dependent Variable      
Reported Hate Crime 
Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables      




































































































Education  0.000596 *** (1.23248)   
0.000483 *** 
(1.8731) 
Unemployment   0.26947 (-0.26011)  
0.034736 * 
(-0.5483) 
Income    0.16955 (0.77642) 
0.087040 
(-1.7112) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: Groups 
(N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Arab/Arab American population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Table 37: Regression Output for Estimated Arab/Arab American Population, Jenness and Grattet Typology 
 
Dependent Variable      
Reported Hate Crime 
Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables      




































































































Education  0.0226 * (-0.21485)   
0.0290 * 
(0.35828) 
Unemployment   0.8270 (-1.485e-02)  
0.4466 
(-0.05256) 
Income    1.14e-06 *** (-0.26786) 
5.64e-05 *** 
(-0.53002) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: Groups 
(N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Hispanic population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Table 38: Regression Output for Estimated Hispanic Population, Jenness and Grattet Typology 
 
Dependent Variable      
Reported Hate Crime 
Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables      




































































































Education  0.000582 *** (0.34165)   
0.403591 
(0.20319) 
Unemployment   0.000179 *** (-0.35970)  
0.003319 ** 
(-0.29003) 
Income    0.000579 *** (0.25432) 
0.810059 
(0.04378) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: Groups 
(N)      
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated American Indian and Alaskan Native population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 








Dependent Variable      
Reported Hate Crime 
Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables      



































































































Education  0.08221 (0.11177)   
0.000162 *** 
(0.56391) 
Unemployment   0.02407 * (-0.12549)  
0.008935 ** 
(-0.15037) 
Income    0.73977 (0.01578) 
0.000390 *** 
(-0.42237) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: Groups 
(N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
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Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Jewish population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Table 40: Regression Output for Estimated Jewish Population, Jenness and Grattet Typology 
 
Dependent Variable      
Reported Hate Crime 
Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent Variables      



































































































Education  0.01867 * (0.4473)   
0.42314 
(0.17640) 
Unemployment   0.000273 *** (-0.29669)  
0.00305 ** 
(-0.25345) 
Income    0.00156 ** 0.22662 
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(0.4758) (0.24708) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: Groups 
(N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Muslim population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 


































APPENDIX 6: REPORTED HATE CRIME RATE AND PERCENTAGE OF 
POPULATION COVERED BY PARTICIPATING AGENCIES 
Dependent 
Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 











< 2e-16 *** 
(1.72149) 
Education  0.422 (0.1012)   
8.54e-09 *** 
(0.79810) 
Unemployment   0.00118 ** (-0.16402)  
4.27e-05 *** 
(-0.20670) 
Income    <2e-16 *** (-0.33747) 
< 2e-16 *** 
(-0.91918) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated African American population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 










Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.0922 (-0.2671)   
0.0293 * 
(0.35255) 
Unemployment   0.151 (-0.09837)  
0.0233 * 
(-0.14345) 
Income    <2e-16 *** (-0.84178) 
< 2e-16 *** 
(-1.10533) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Asian/Asian American population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 












Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.0434 * (0.7630)   
0.005953 ** 
(1.5305) 
Unemployment   0.486440 (-0.1623)  
0.071619 
(-0.4813) 
Income    0.768615 (-0.1837) 
0.048649 * 
(-2.0750) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Arab/Arab American population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 












Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 









< 2e-16 *** 
(1.44734) 
< 2e-16 *** 
(1.44326) 
Education  0.00121 ** (-0.3558)   
0.162 
(0.21313) 
Unemployment   0.446 (-0.04870)  
0.271 
(-0.07258) 
Income    5.35e-14 *** (-0.38767) 
7.16e-06 *** 
(-0.54712) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Hispanic population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 












Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.303 (0.1124)   
0.59183 
(-0.1578) 
Unemployment   0.000555 *** (-0.3488)  
0.00229 ** 
(-0.3280) 
Income    0.127 (0.11586) 
0.51460 
(0.1384) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated American Indian and Alaskan Native 
population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Table 46: Regression Output for Estimated American Indian and Alaskan Native Population, Percentage of 










Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 









< 2e-16 *** 
(1.35106) 
< 2e-16 *** 
(1.33911) 
Education  0.234 (-0.07941)   
0.000516 *** 
(0.48751) 
Unemployment   0.103 (-0.08713)  
0.013141 * 
(-0.13251) 
Income    0.000488 *** (-0.14364) 
2.4e-06 *** 
(-0.51523) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Jewish population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 












Variable      
Reported Hate 
Crime Rate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent 













Education  0.0851 (0.3085)   
0.895052 
(0.02829) 
Unemployment   3.39e-05 *** (-0.33143)  
0.000417 *** 
(-0.29416) 
Income    0.00306 ** (0.4180) 
0.180242 
(0.26303) 
N 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
Random effects: 
Groups (N) 
     
States 50 50 50 50 50 
Years 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; offset is estimated Muslim population 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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